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SECTION 404 AT THIRTY-SOMETHING:
A PROGRAM IN SEARCH OF A POLICY
Alyson C. Flournoy*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, as the Clean Water Act ("CWA")' turned thirty, the program
that regulates the discharge of dredged and fill material into water and wet-
lands was beset by an all too familiar turbulence. The Supreme Court's
2001 decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers2 ("SWANCC') had churned up debate and litigation
over the jurisdictional reach of section 404 of the CWA. 3 The announce-
ment by the Bush Administration that it planned to propose new regulations
to codify its interpretation of SWANCC,4 replacing guidance adopted in the
waning days of the Clinton Administration, 5 created uncertainty and threat-
ened to reduce the scope of wetlands protection dramatically.6 Issues that
had been considered settled roiled into fights over the significance of the
ordinary high water mark, and the meaning of and proof required to demon-
* Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I am grateful to Christine Klein
for thoughtful comments on a draft of this Article, to Richard Hamann and Oliver Houck for sharing
their ideas about wetlands law and policy, and to Jill Kelso and Kelly Martinson for exceptional research
assistance.
I. The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
2. 531 U.S. 159(2001).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
4. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of
"Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003 [hereinafter Bush Admin. ANPR].
5. Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), and Robert M. Andersen, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), to the
Assistant Administrator for Water et al. (Jan. 19, 2001), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/swancc-ogc.pdf [hereinafter Guzy-Andersen Memo].
6. At stake were between twenty and eighty percent of the country's remaining wetlands. The
percentage of wetlands ultimately affected would depend not only on whose estimates one accepted, but
also how far the Bush Administration would take the opportunity to reduce Corps jurisdictional rules
beyond what the holding of SWANNC dictated (invalidating the migratory bird rule as a basis for assert-
ing jurisdiction under section 404). Regarding Implications of the Supreme Court's SWANCC Decision:
Hearing Before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural
Res. & Regulatory Affairs, 107th Cong. (Sept. 19, 2002) (statement of Patrick Parenteau, Professor of
Law, Vermont Law School), available at 2002 WL 31123956 [hereinafter Parenteau Testimony]. Com-
ments on a leaked version of the proposed rule suggested that the new rule would have excluded one-
fifth of the remaining wetlands, which would mean roughly 20 million acres in the lower forty-eight
states. Elizabeth Shogren, Rule Drafted That Would Dilute the Clean Water Act, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6,
2003, at Al2, available at 2003 WL 2446562.
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strate a "hydrologic connection."7 Then, just as abruptly, newly-confirmed
EPA Administrator Michael Leavitt repudiated the proposed rule, announc-
ing that the agency was dropping plans to narrow the scope of jurisdiction.8
Only a year earlier, in 2001, the National Academy of Sciences and the
General Accounting Office had both issued reports criticizing the imple-
mentation of mitigation requirements under section 404, the latest in a long
series of reports critiquing the program and the Army Corps of Engineers
(the "Corps"). 9 Over the years, both governmental and non-governmental
reports have highlighted the persistent gaps in knowledge, enforcement,
monitoring, funding, and interagency coordination under section 404, and
the attendant disappointing results.
This turmoil surrounding the CWA's thirtieth anniversary is not new. A
review of the section 404 program's evolution under successive administra-
tions reveals a program (and agency) perpetually in flux with a poorly-
defined goal. A broad look at section 404's first thirty years highlights im-
portant tensions that have beset the section 404 program from its inception.
These tensions can be traced in large measure to four structural flaws in
section 404's design: the lack of a clear goal, the conflicts inherent in the
Corps-EPA-section 404 relationship, reliance on a water statute to protect
wetlands, and the regulation of activities in wetlands under a pollution con-
trol approach. A review of the first thirty years of regulation under section
404 illustrates how these flaws have limited and distorted the development
of wetlands policy.
This Article focuses on three controversies that have dominated debate
over wetlands during this period-jurisdiction, delineation, and the scope of
activities regulated by section 404-and shows how the limitations inherent
7. Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407, 416-17 (4th Cir. 2003) petition for cert. filed 72
U.S.L.W. 3310 (Oct. 27, 2003) (No. 03-637) (holding tributaries of navigable water can include man-
made ditches and thus adjacent wetlands fall under the jurisdiction of the CWA); United States v. Ra-
panos, 339 F.3d 447, 450-53 (6th Cir. 2003) petition for cert. filed 72 U.S.L.W. 3451 (Dec. 22, 2003)
(No. 03-929) (finding wetlands with a hydrologic connection between themselves, a drain, and a river to
be covered by the CWA, even though they are eleven to twenty miles from navigable-in-fact water);
FD&P Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 516 (D.N.J. 2003) (finding a "sig-
nificant nexus" between wetlands and navigable waters "must constitute more than a mere 'hydrological
connection"'); United States v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780, 788 (E.D. Va. 2002) (finding a con-
tinuous ordinary high water mark necessary for drainage ditches and ephemeral streams to be classified
as waters of the United States and thus grant the Corps jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands); United
States v. Lamplight Equestrian Ctr., 2002 WL 360652, at *6-*7 (N.D. 11. Mar. 8, 2002) (holding critical
jurisdiction issue to be whether there is a significant nexus between wetlands and a navigable body of
water, noting "water need not flow in an unbroken line at all times" and connection need not be direct).
8. Felicity Barringer, U.S. Won't Narrow Wetlands Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003, at A35.
9. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER
THE CLEAN WATER ACT (2001) [hereinafter COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES]; GEN. AcCr.
OFFICE, WETLANDS PROTECTION: ASSESSMENTS NEEDED TO DETERMINE EFFECTIVENESS OF IN-LIEU-
FEE MITIGATION, GAO-01-325 (May 2001). Earlier reports included GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, WETLANDS:
THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS' ADMINISTRATION OF THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM, GAO/RCED-88-1 10
[hereinafter GAO, CORPS ADMIN.]; GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, WETLANDS PROTECTION: THE SCOPE OF THE
SECTION 404 PROGRAM REMAINS UNCERTAIN, GAO/RCED-93-26 (Apr. 1993); and GEN. ACCT.
OFFICE, WETLANDS OVERVIEW: PROBLEMS WITH ACREAGE DATA PERSIST, GAO/RCED-98-150 (July
1998).
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in section 404 have contributed to endless conflict over these issues, with
little long-term benefit to policy development. In place of meaningful policy
debate, we are trapped in seemingly endless battles over implementation
issues. These demand enormous energy and resources to resolve and sup-
plant meaningful debate about both goals and policy. A close look at the
struggles over section 404's reform shows what a limited context these is-
sues provide for real policy development.
My contention is not that these technical issues are or were unreason-
able subjects of debate for those concerned with wetlands and with wetlands
regulation. Indeed, I maintain they are logical areas of contention that de-
mand resolution under section 404. However, I suggest that these subjects
provide a narrow and sometimes distorted field for debate. Thus, the realm
of wetlands is viewed as a morass with little clarity, and we remain with
little sense of our goals.
Reforms and debates that arise in this context seem doomed to provide
limited solutions that ultimately fail to account for what we know and claim
to value about wetlands.' 0 For those seeking to develop a national policy on
wetlands protection, these debates are not a promising context. These de-
bates and battles represent at best the chance to defend the flawed section
404 program-a limited defensive strategy.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with any particular steps in the debate
on and reforms under section 404 to date, we need to recognize that this
process is not leading us to towards a clear policy or goal on wetlands. The
path we are following cannot substitute for a more comprehensive look at
our national goals and policy regarding wetlands.
Over the past thirty years, scholars have provided detailed and trenchant
critiques of wetlands regulation under section 404, detailing its shortcom-
ings, agency and executive missteps, and proposed improvements." This
Article seeks to gain whatever advantage the perspective of thirty years of-
fers, to sketch the overarching picture that emerges from a look at section
404's history. I am not the first to see much of what emerges. The perspec-
tive of thirty years, though, confirms that we can no longer afford to focus
on the narrow issues at the expense of broader reform, if we truly wish to
conserve wetlands.
To begin, this Article examines why wetlands policy has failed to ma-
ture in its first thirty years. In Part II, it recounts the path of section 404's
10. This goes beyond the inherent limitations of relying on section 404 as the main regulatory tool
to emphasize the constraints section 404 imposes on the realm of debate and of possible solutions.
II. Hope Babcock, Federal Wetlands Regulatory Policy: Up to Its Ears in Alligators, 8 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 307 (1991); Michael C. Blumm, The Clean Water Act's Section 404 Permit Program
Enters Its Adolescence: An Institutional and Programmatic Perspective, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 409 (1980)
[hereinafter Blumm, Adolescence]; Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protec-
tion Under the Clean Water Act: Regulator, Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for
Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695 (1989); Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save Amer-
ica's Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. REV. 358 (1988) [hereinafter Houck, War]; Oliver A. Houck, Hard
Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar Environ-
mental Laws, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 773 (1989) [hereinafter Houck, Alternatives].
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evolution under various administrations' leadership, showing how wetlands
policy has remained constantly in flux and poorly defined. Part III describes
the four structural limitations of the section 404 program that have inhibited
wetlands policy development. Part IV then turns to the consequences of
these structural flaws. First, it describes three prominent sources of contro-
versy under section 404-jurisdiction, delineation, and the scope of activi-
ties regulated-and highlights the attention and resources these issues have
demanded, supplanting broader policy debate. Second, it considers the way
in which section 404's structural flaws contributed to these issues' promi-
nence, and how the attention devoted to these issues has provided a narrow
and distorted focus for wetlands policy development. Part V turns to what
has been missing from public debate: the key facts and value choices we
must confront and embrace. Part VI concludes with a call for a broad policy
debate.
II. THIRTY YEARS WITHOUT A COURSE
Commentators have often noted the lack of a national goal or policy on
wetlands. 12 We can assess the effect of our current practices and de facto
policies by looking at the state of our wetlands. From this view, it is appar-
ent that current law and practice allow the destruction of wetlands at a
steady pace.' 3 One might say that this is, in fact, our de facto national policy
and goal, though few would own it willingly. Depending on whether one is
an optimist or a pessimist, one could state the goal of our policies as slow-
ing the destruction of wetlands or destroying our remaining wetlands
slowly. Both of these are possible descriptions of current policies, yet the
two imply vastly different objectives. Our policies reflect this fatal ambigu-
ity about our objectives.
To claim that we lack a goal and policy on wetlands is not to say that
there has been no attention to the overall direction of the section 404 pro-
gram. Indeed, both agency heads and presidents during this period have
sought to control the program, and the lack of a clear statutory mandate has
provided them with considerable room for maneuvering. The following
quick review of efforts to steer wetlands policy over these thirty years re-
veals that these efforts to exert control rarely entailed articulation of a goal
or meaningful policy. Instead, these have produced a program almost per-
petually in flux whose goal has been poorly defined.
12. THE CONSERVATION FOUND., PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: AN ACTION AGENDA, THE
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM 1, 3 (1988) [hereinafter PROTECTING
AMERICA'S WETLANDS]; Curtis C. Bohlen, Wetlands Politics From a Landscape Perspective, 4 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1992-93). This is often coupled with the broader observation that we lack a
national water policy altogether. Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a National Water
Policy and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REV. 873, 873 n. 1 (1993).
13. As Professor Babcock aptly wrote about section 404, "[In reality, the section authorizes the
destruction of wetlands rather than the protection of these valuable resources." Babcock, supra note 11,
at 320.
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The early years of the section 404 program were marked by the tension
between the effort of the Corps to maintain its focus on navigation and con-
servationists' and courts' pressure to expand jurisdiction. In its initial en-
forcement and rulemaking, the Corps resisted exercising jurisdiction beyond
that which it had exercised under the predecessor Rivers and Harbors Act,
until judicial decisions forced its hand. 4 Following the 1977 amendments to
the CWA, the Corps and the EPA contended over which agency would
make jurisdictional determinations and whether the EPA's guidelines bound
the Corps.15 The Corps retained its traditional focus on maintaining naviga-
tion, while the EPA pursued its mission of environmental conservation. The
early history of the section 404 program suggests a program in search of its
soul.
After litigation in the late 1970s and the 1977 amendments confirmed
the binding nature of the EPA guidelines and the broader jurisdictional
scope of the section 404 program, the Corps and the EPA seemed to be
moving towards following a single path that included the broader conserva-
tion mission. The Corps published extensive regulations, and the agencies
reached landmark agreements during the 1980s, resolving critical issues
regarding jurisdictional determinations, enforcement, and mitigation. 16 With
this basic question of philosophy apparently resolved, the section 404 pro-
gram presented successive administrations an opportunity to develop wet-
lands conservation policy.
Rather than clarifying the goal of the section 404 program, the history
of presidential politics over the past thirty years exacerbated and prolonged
turmoil in the section 404 program. 17 Shifts in direction and mandate for the
Corps have demanded frequent reinventions within the agency. One ob-
server of the Corps described the agency's passage through this period as
like that of a huge tanker that responds slowly to changes in course and has
been redirected too often. Just as the bow of the tanker finally reaches a
heading set by presidential directive or judicial decision, a change in course
is announced, squandering the momentum and resources of the agency to
bring the tanker around once again. 18
14. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974). The 1977 amendments to the CWA raised the prospect of
narrowing Corps jurisdiction to navigable waters only, but the attempts failed. See Kalen, supra note 12,
at 898-903. The amendments did narrow the scope of the individual permit program via exemptions for a
wide range of agricultural activities and authority for general permits. Id. at 901.
15. Houck, Alternatives, supra note 11, at 775; Kalen, supra note 12, at 905-06.
16. These agreements were expressed in a Memoranda of Agreement on enforcement and sequenc-
ing and in a joint delineation manual. WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION § 2:9, at 2-
12 to 2-14 (2000); see also Blumm, Adolescence, supra note 11, at 438.
17. See Jon Kusler, Wetlands Delineation: An Issue of Science or Politics?, ENV'T, Mar. 1992, at 7,
10.
18. Telephone Interview with Richard Hamann, Associate in Law, Center for Governmental Re-
sponsibility (Jan. 12, 2004). The challenge and cost in time and resources of implementing these changes
in direction is magnified by the fact that the Corps' structure includes so many loci of decision. See also
2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.12, at 185 (1986); Kusler,
supra note 17, at 10. Other observers might be less sanguine that the Corps ever changed its original
2004]
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In the early 1980s, as new regulations and interagency agreements were
developing to resolve key Corps and EPA differences,' 9 the Reagan Ad-
ministration leadership moved the Corps back towards its roots, away from
restrictive regulation. 20 Then-Vice President Bush's Task Force on Regula-
tory Reform developed proposals directed at reducing the burden of regula-
tion.2' The shift reignited tensions with the EPA.22
Congress approved a series of non-regulatory wetlands conservation ini-
tiatives. Although initiated under the Farm Bill, the effort complemented
wetland protection under section 404. The Swampbuster program was en-
acted in 1985 with the express purpose of discouraging agricultural wetland
conversion.23 It achieved this purpose by generally precluding farmers who
converted wetlands from receiving agricultural subsidies. Thus, Swamp-
buster both reached activities that were generally excluded from regulation
under section 404 and simultaneously sought to remove the incentives that
federal subsidies had created for undesirable wetland conversion.24
By the late 1980s, as the 1988 presidential election neared, the political
winds seemed about to settle to enable policy development. With EPA sup-
port, the Conservation Foundation initiated a National Wetlands Policy Fo-
rum (the "Forum"), a bipartisan effort to "address major policy concerns
about how the nation should protect and manage its valuable wetlands re-
sources." 25 The Forum identified serious problems in our national efforts to
protect wetlands, including the lack of a goal and recommended adoption of
a national policy of achieving no net loss of wetlands acreage and function,
and, where feasible, an increase in wetlands quality and quantity.26 The final
report from the Forum initially received bipartisan support, with both Re-
publican and Democratic candidates in the 1988 election committing to
wetlands protection. Upon his election, President Bush adopted "no net
loss" as his stated policy and appointed William Reilly-former President
of the Conservation Foundation who had played a leading role in the Fo-
institutional orientation and identity as the nation's premier dredger. See Blumm & Zaleha, supra note
11, at 771.
19. The Corps published extensive regulations, and the agencies reached landmark agreements by
the late 1980s, resolving critical issues regarding jurisdictional determinations, enforcement, and mitiga-
tion. These agreements were expressed in a Memoranda of Agreement on enforcement and sequencing
and in a joint delineation manual. WANT, supra note 16, § 2:9, at 2-12 to 2-14; see also Blumm, Adoles-
cence, supra note 11, at 438.
20. This history is described in Houck, Alternatives, supra note 11, at 781-83; see also Babcock,
supra note 11, at 308 n.4.
21. See Houck, Alternatives, supra note 11, at 781-83.
22. Id. at 782-83.
23. Swampbuster was initiated under the 1985 Food Security Act and amended in 1990. It is for-
mally titled the Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation and Reserve Program. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-24
(2000).
24. RALPH E. HEIMLICH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., WETLANDS AND
AGRICULTURE: PRIVATE INTERESTS AND PUBLIC BENEFITS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REPORT No.
765, at 25 (1998) [hereinafter WETLANDS AND AGRICULTURE].
25. PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS, supra note 12, at 7.
26. Id. at 3. The report also detailed a series of recommendations to help in achieving this goal.
[Vol. 55:3:607
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rum-as the Administrator of the EPA.27 Despite some skepticism from
environmentalists about what "no net loss" would mean on the ground,28
there seemed to be consensus emerging on a goal of "no net loss" and op-
portunity for serious debate on policies to achieve this goal.29
Soon after, however, the Bush Administration reversed its vigorous
commitment to wetlands protection, responding to industry pressure.
30
President Bush yielded the policy reins to Vice President Quayle's Council
on Competitiveness, the primary focus of which was reducing regulatory
burdens. I The message to the Corps was clear. The tanker hove to and re-
turned to the course it had early charted, resisting broad jurisdiction and
identifying with those seeking permits rather than those who argued for
enhanced protection. The White House proposed to adopt a new delineation
manual that dramatically reduced the areas that qualified as wetlands. 32 De-
spite this shift in policy under section 404, support continued for non-
regulatory programs, with the addition of the Wetlands Reserve Program in
1990.1
3
With President Clinton's election, a slightly new tone was set, this time
an ambiguous commitment to "balance., 34 The message to the agencies
seemed to be to please everyone and anger no one. Professor Blumm aptly
described the effect: "The Clinton plan, in short, strove to achieve that elu-
sive 'balance' so necessary in resource disputes, where making everyone a
little unhappy, yet giving everyone something, is considered the paradigm
of reasonableness. 35 President Clinton's plan purported to adopt "no net
loss" as an interim goal and to aspire to net gain over the long term. 36 But
the essence of the Clinton plan was to work within the section 404 frame-
work and to try to overcome divisive debate by measured responses to the
most moderate and least controversial criticisms from all sides. Thus, it at-
tempted to promote fairness through clarity and consistency in regulatory
definitions in response to landowner complaints. It endorsed mitigation
banking in response to criticisms of existing mitigation outcomes and
27. Babcock, supra note I1, at 308 n.4.
28. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 11, at 762-63 (describing the Forum's apparent uninformed reli-
ance on wetland creation and restoration and failure to recognize that wetlands are not fungible).
29. Id.
30. The history of this backlash is described in Babcock, supra note II, at 339-40 nn.154-57.
31. WANT, supra note 16, § 2:9, at 2-14.
32. This conflict is described in more detail infra Part IV.A.2.
33. The Wetlands Reserve Program was created under the Farmers Home Administration Improve-
ment Act of 1994, 7 U.S.C. § 1985(g) (2000).
34. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ON ENVTL. POLICY, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: A FAIR,
FLEXIBLE, AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH (Aug. 24, 1993), available at
http://www.wetlands.com/fed/aug93wet.htm [hereinafter A FAIR, FLEXIBLE, AND EFFICIENT
APPROACH]; Michael C. Blumm, The Clinton Wetlands Plan: No Net Gain in Wetlands Protection, 9 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 204 (1994) [hereinafter Blumm, No Net Gain].
35. Blumm, No Net Gain, supra note 34, at 205.
36. A FAIR, FLEXIBLE, AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH, supra note 34.
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adopted the ill-fated Tulloch Rule to address the concern over activities that
escaped the scope of section 404. 37
Under President George W. Bush, wetlands have been a focus largely in
connection with the implementation of the SWANCC decision. Encountering
the post-SWANCC turmoil described earlier, the Administration first seemed
prepared to exert no influence. Initial guidance supplied by the Corps and
the EPA seemed to offer no change in direction. The subsequent decision to
initiate rulemaking to revisit section 404 jurisdiction broadly indicated a
change in course. The Administration appeared ready to take the opportu-
nity to reduce section 404's geographic scope substantially under the banner
that the changes were required by the Supreme Court's decision.38 One
analysis of a leaked version of the agencies' proposed rule suggested it
would exclude a fifth of the remaining wetlands and dramatically reduce
protection in the arid West and Southwest, eliminating protection of 80% to
90% of the streams in the Southwest. 39 When public outcry opposing this
outcome ensued, the EPA and Corps backed away from the proposed rule
and announced that they were abandoning plans to narrow protection within
weeks.4°
Two qualities emerge from this cursory glimpse at the history. First, it
reveals a constantly shifting direction. This zigzag course of policy evolu-
tion is inefficient because the incipient agency policies and practices never
mature. But such changes in course are not unique to wetlands protection.
More disturbing than the shifts in policy, though, is the second attribute that
this history suggests: the absence of an honest articulation of policy
throughout most of this period. Shifts in policy can signal a healthy democ-
ratic process at work. But changes in policy that are not publicly articulated
or that masquerade as technical decisions undermine accountability and
discourage public involvement. Shifts in direction characterized vaguely as
introducing "regulatory reform" or "balance" to some unnamed existing
policy do not substitute for a statement of goals or policy. The long period
without a policy or goal has prevented healthy debate and undermined ac-
countability. It is too easy for all involved to intone the proper words and
claim a vague commitment to wetlands in place of a true goal or policy.
Even a phrase with substantial content as a goal, such as "no net loss,"
now seems to have lost all meaning from overuse in an empty debate. Our
leaders have never seriously engaged questions about what "no net loss"
means in terms of preserving wetland functions and values and distribution
across the landscape. From 1988 until today, we have operated under a
stated policy of "no net loss" of wetlands.4' Yet, no one can believe that we
37. Id. See infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of this rule.
38. See Bush Admin. ANPR, supra note 4, at 1993-94.
39. Shogren, supra note 6, at At2.
40. Barringer, supra note 8, at A35.
41. See U.S. EPA News Release, EPA and Army Corps Issue Wetlands Decision (Dec. 16, 2003),
available at http://www.usace.army.millinet/functions/cwicecwo/reg/swaanc-release.htm (reiterating
Bush Administration commitment to no net loss); A FAIR, FLEXIBLE, AND EFFICIENT APPROACH, supra
[Vol. 55:3:607
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have had a uniform commitment to that goal over this period. If so, we seem
to be singularly inept at accomplishing our goals. We have never achieved
"no net loss," and most new policy initiatives since 1990 have reduced the
level of protection for wetlands further. Under the guise of "no net loss,"
we are pursuing a very different but unnamed policy, one it would be useful
to name.4 3 "No net loss" serves as a screen behind which agencies operate
and a pleasing backdrop in front of which the Executive can announce all
new initiatives, whether or not they move us closer to no net loss.44 Neither
the President, nor Congress, nor the agencies have an incentive to upset this
cozy picture, while we continue to drift forward, losing wetlands at a slow,
steady pace.
III. STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO POLICY DEVELOPMENT
If we are to seize some future occasion for serious debate and commit to
a national policy, we must first appreciate the context in which that debate
will occur. This demands that we explore why we have labored for thirty
years without a goal. Among the forces that have worked against clarity in
the policy debate, four attributes of section 404 stand out: (1) the lack of a
clear statutory goal, (2) the conflict inherent in the Corps-EPA-section 404
relationship, (3) reliance on a water statute to protect wetlands, and (4) the
regulation of activities in wetlands under a pollution control approach. Any
effort to reform section 404 and develop a wetlands policy will necessarily
confront these flaws and require conscious effort to overcome them.
A. Lack of a Clear Goal
In the search for a goal and policies on wetland conservation, the natu-
ral starting point is the language of section 404, the authority for the most
visible program to prevent the destruction of wetlands.45 One turns to the
note 34, at 4; and sources cited in Babcock, supra note 11, at nn. 1, 137.
42. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text (describing George W. Bush Administration initia-
tives); see also supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (describing Clinton Administration initiatives);
and supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (describing George H.W. Bush Administration initia-
tives).
43. See id.
44. Blumm, No Net Gain, supra note 34, at 203 (describing fanfare surrounding Clinton plan);
Babcock, supra note 11, at nn. 1, 137 (describing George H.W. Bush announcement).
45. There are a number of agricultural subsidy and disincentive provisions that have played a sig-
nificant role in wetlands conservation including the highly successful Swampbuster program under the
Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation and Reserve Program, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-24 (2000), and the
Wetlands Reserve Program under the Farmers Home Administration Improvement Act of 1994, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1985(g) (2000). Other statutes whose authority promotes wetlands conservation in whole or in part
include the Water Bank Program for Wetlands Preservation, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1301-11 (2000); Wetlands
Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3901-32 (2000); Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3951-56 (2000); Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
12 (2000); Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 715k-3 (2000); and Protection and Conserva-
tion of Wildlife, 16 U.S.C. § 662 (2000). Detailed discussion of these programs is beyond the scope of
this Article. But the problems and opportunities posed by this patchwork of programs are discussed
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statute for adequate direction on its purposes in vain. The elliptical statutory
command of section 404 provides fodder for endless arguments about the
goal of the program. Those who favor reduced protection of wetlands point
to the failure of Congress even to mention wetlands in the statute, the stat-
ute's jurisdictional focus on "navigable waters," and the lack of explicit
direction in section 404 for protection of the many ecological values that the
EPA and Corps regulations consider.46 Those advocating protection, on the
other hand, point to the statute's goal to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters, 47 the statutory
mandate that the EPA develop guidelines with ecological criteria,48 and the
evidence in legislative history that Congress disclaimed an exclusive focus
on navigable waters under section 404 and has endorsed and espoused pro-
tection of wetlands and the values they embody.49
But, as with many environmental laws, the legislative process did not
produce a clear statement of Congress's goal in enacting section 404 and the
policy that Congress sought to pursue. Instead, Congress left issues to be
resolved through the application of agency discretion or resolution in the
courts.50 However, section 404 is perhaps the extreme case-a statute whose
most frequently cited mission is to protect wetlands but which fails to men-
tion wetlands. In section 404, Congress left key questions not only unan-
swered but unasked.
B. Tension Inherent in the Corps-EPA-Section 404 Relationship
Congress's commitment of the section 404 program to the joint custody
of the Corps and the EPA is the second structural element that set us on a
path fraught with tension, further clouding the policy waters. 51 The decision
to charge the Corps with implementing section 404 has been labeled
further infra Part VI.
46. Virginia S. Albrecht & Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Could SWANCC Be Right? A New Look at the
Legislative History of the Clean Water Act, 32 DAILY ENVTL. L. REP. 11,042, 11,046-48 (Sept. 2002);
Sheila Deely & Mark Latham, The Federal Wetlands Program: A Regulatory Program Run Amuck, 34
DAILY ENV'T. REP. 966 (Apr. 25, 2003); Corps, EPA Mull Wetlands Regs to Address SWANCC,
ENDANGERED SPECIES & WETLANDS REP. 24 (Oct. 2002) (noting Albrecht testimony before House
Committee). Even the most zealous advocates do not claim that Congress intended to exclude wetlands
altogether by failing to mention them. Their claim is typically that extensive regulation of wetlands that
are not adjacent to navigable waters was beyond Congress's intent.
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000); Parenteau Testimony, supra note 6; see also Corps, EPA Mull
Wetlands Regs to Address SWANCC, supra note 46.
48. Section 404(b) directs the EPA to develop guidelines with criteria comparable to those required
by Section 403. Section 403(c) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1343(c), sets forth a broad array of factors the
EPA is to incorporate in guidelines to govern ocean discharges. These include various human health and
welfare, ecological, esthetic, recreational, and economic factors. Id.
49. See WANT, supra note 16, § 2:8, at 2-10 n.2; Kalen, supra note 12, at 887-905.
50. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 242-50
(1990) (describing the pressures that often prevent Congress from resolving fundamental policy ques-
tions).
51. The conflict over this decision is summarized in Kalen, supra note 12, at 887-90. The resulting
problems in implementation are summarized in Houck, Alternatives, supra note 11, at 774-75.
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"ironic" by one leading authority,52 and "a recipe for endless conflict" by
another.5 3 The Corps' role as the nation's premier dredger and its historic
antipathy for environmental conservation raised immediate concerns about
section 404's potential to achieve conservation of wetlands. Granting the
Corps broad discretion in making permit decisions54 under an explicitly
environmental statute sent very mixed signals. Assigning the EPA to draft
guidelines for the Corps and to wield veto power complicated the message
and set up a clash that occupied the agencies for much of the 1970s, into the
1980s, detracting from any sustained policy development within the agen-
cies.55
C. Reliance on a Water Statute to Protect Wetlands
The third structural limitation in section 404 is that it seeks to protect
wetlands as a category of water. The decision to address wetlands protection
under the CWA was logical in many ways. The predecessor Rivers and
Harbors Act had been applied to wetlands and was a water-focused statute.
Wetlands stand out from the rest of the landscape by virtue of their hydrol-
ogy-their water aspect. And many of the unique values associated with
wetlands depend on wetlands' hydrology. Moreover, the interstate nature of
many waters provided a constitutional basis for federal regulation. But the
relegation of wetlands concerns exclusively to the CWA and the definition
of wetlands as a subset of "waters" necessarily skewed our thinking about
wetlands and wetlands policy.
The emphasis on the water aspect of wetlands places emphasis on a
subset of the values and functions of wetlands at the cost of others. It may
also reflect our ambivalence about wetlands and a desire to avoid confront-
ing wetlands on their own terms. Wetlands pose a challenge to our dualistic
thinking that divides the landscape into water and land. Neither an approach
focused solely on wetlands as land nor one focused on their identity as wa-
ter can fully capture wetlands and their value. The decision to adopt a water
approach without pursuing a complementary effort focused on wetlands'
character as land represents a serious constraint in the development of fed-
eral wetlands policy.
52. WANT, supra note 16, § 2:7, at 2-9 n.6.
53. Oliver A. Houck, More Net Loss of Wetlands: The Arn y-EPA Memorandum of Agreement on
Mitigation Under the Section 404 Program, 20 ENVTL L. REP. 10,212, 10,212 (June 1990) [hereinafter
Houck, More Net Loss of Wetlands].
54. See 2 RODGERS, supra note 18, § 4.12, at 186. As has been often noted, section 404 initially
provided almost no guidance on how the Corps should exercise this discretion but merely granted them
power to grant permits for discharge of dredged and fill material that would otherwise violate the basic
prohibition against discharges under section 301 of the CWA. Id. at 182. Subsequent amendments have
done little to provide guidance but have created a number of exemptions and authority for general per-
mits. Id. at 187-93.
55. See Babcock, supra note 11, at 328-41 (describing history of disagreement over mitigation);
Houck, Alternatives, supra note 11, at 774-84.
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Another problem with regulating wetlands destruction under a wa-
ter statute is the clash created by the frequency with which the regulated
conduct occurs as part of land development activities. The existence of a
substantial federal constraint operating in a realm largely thought to be
regulated by state and local government has caused tension and visceral
resistance.56 But as Professor Malone has pointed out, the claimed absence
of federal constraints on land use may be a convenient myth perpetuated in
the hopes of bringing it to reality.57 At the least, the involvement of local,
state, and federal decisionmakers creates complexity and opportunities for
conflict.58 And the intersection of local decisionmaking processes focused
on land and its potential uses with federal regulatory processes that seek to
preserve the hydrologic aspects of wetlands and prevent their conversion to
dry land creates inevitable tension. This tension results not just from the
structure of section 404 but from the inherently transitional nature of wet-
lands-their failure to fit neatly into our dualistic view of the landscape as
land and water.
D. The Pollution Control/Permitting Approach
A fourth limitation inherent in section 404's structure is its reliance on a
pollution control/permitting model. Section 404 is designed to limit dis-
charges, just as is section 402 of the CWA 59 and other pollution control
permit programs. Its focus is on specific conduct that degrades the wetland,
rather than overall protection of the resource. 60 Section 404 regulates spe-
cific types of harm to wetlands, namely those caused by discharging into the
wetlands, while ignoring other types of activity that can degrade wetlands'
integrity and impair their value. Draining wetlands, dredging without a dis-
charge, and degradation of the surrounding landscape can all have devastat-
ing consequences yet escape regulation under section 404. Recent battles
over fallback of dredged material6' and deep ripping practices62 illustrate the
56. Blumm, Adolescence, supra note i1, at 464.
57. Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths that Ended the 2000 TMDL Program, 20 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 63, 79 (2002).
58. 2 RODGERS, supra note 18, § 4.12, at 185; Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 11, at 760-61 (suggest-
ing the benefits and necessity of pluralism in decisionmaking in this context).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2000).
60. WANT, supra note 16, § 4:53, at 4-27 to 4-34 (detailing the various categories of activities that
are regulated under section 404); Blumm, Adolescence, supra note 11, at 418.
61. The settlement of North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Tulloch, Civ. No. C90-713-CIV-5-BO
(E.D.N.C. 1992), led to the issuance of the Tulloch Rule which invoked regulation of fallback from
dredging regardless of quantity unless exempted because there was no impact or the action involved
"normal dredging operations" in navigable waters. Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008 (Aug. 25, 1993).
Subsequent litigation led to invalidation of the regulation of incidental fallback that occurred as part of a
net withdrawal, prompting further revisions. See Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition
of "Discharge of Dredged Material," 65 Fed. Reg. 25,121, 25,122 (Apr. 28, 2000); Further Revisions to
the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of Dredged Material," 66 Fed. Reg. 4550,
4550 (Jan. 17, 2001) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d) and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2).
62. See Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir.
2001), affyd by an equally divided court, 537 U.S. 99 (2002) (holding that deep ripping constitutes an
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struggle to determine which degrading practices are covered by section 404
and which are left unregulated.
The focus on discharges into wetlands also ignores the reality that the
threats to wetlands are different in kind from most other sources of air and
water pollution. Much of the activity that degrades wetlands is undertaken
with the goal of destroying the wetlands by converting them to dry land or
open water. Most other polluting activities use the relevant resource (i.e.,
air, water, or land) as a sink for wastes, but only because waste is an unfor-
tunate and undesired byproduct of an otherwise profitable activity. In con-
trast, the filling of wetlands often demands an effort to find fill to dispose of
in the wetland so that the wetland can be converted to dry land.63
Thus, unlike other pollution control programs, technology-based con-
trols will not address the problem of wetlands degradation. 64 There can be
no expectation that as pollution control technology improves, less fill will
be generated for disposal in wetlands and fewer wetlands will be dredged or
drained. Filling or dredging the wetlands is the goal and is likely to remain a
goal for landowners and a threat to wetlands. The section 404 program
therefore depends on quality-based protective standards. 65 The history of
environmental regulation has repeatedly demonstrated the difficulty of
translating resource quality-based standards into a tool to affect individuals'
conduct. 66 Hence, it is not surprising that the best section 404 can achieve is
to slow the loss of wetlands. If there are incentives to fill wetlands and no
standards that clearly prohibit it, quality-based standards provide a weak
response. The renowned broad discretion that characterizes the section 404
regulations and landowners' strong interest and economic incentive create
unpermitted discharge of pollutants under the CWA when performed in wetlands due to the excavation
and redeposition of soils during the process).
63. When the goal of dredging is to create open water or channels, the disposal of dredged material
sometimes more closely resembles a traditional pollution control problem. In these situations, the
dredged material is more like other types of unwanted waste that permittees seek to dispose of incident
to clearing channels or dredging harbors. However, like filling wetlands, the purpose of the dredging, if
not the disposal, is often to convert wetlands to something else. That change is the goal, not an unin-
tended consequence.
64. Many scholars have emphasized the efficacy of technology-based controls. See Drew Caputo, A
Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,574, 10,578-79 (1997);
Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 Miss.
L.J. 403, 418 (1994) [hereinafter Houck, Of Bats, Birds]. For a discussion of some wetlands contexts in
which technology-based controls might effectively protect wetlands, see Houck, Alternatives, supra note
11, at 835-36.
65. The section 404 guidelines direct the Corps to focus on protecting various values and qualities
of the wetlands, among other values, in assessing permit applications.
66. Professor William Andreen's history of the CWA illustrates the progress achieved when Con-
gress adopted innovative technology-based standards after a long history of ineffectual quality-based
standards. William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States-State,
Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part 11, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 286-94 (2003). Under the
Clean Air Act, the National Ambient Air Quality Standards created under section 109 have succeeded
because they only act as a benchmark, and additional regulatory tools, including technology-based
standards for new sources (section I 11) and specific technology mandates (such as the lead phasedown
in section 211 and CAFE standards for cars under section 202), have effectuated compliance with air
quality standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7411, 7521,7545.
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tremendous pressure against consistent protection of the quality and values
of wetlands.67
Added to this is the constraint of section 404's reliance on case-by-case
permit determinations to protect wetlands from what are the cumulative
effects of development.68 Most of the loss of functions and values caused by
wetlands degradation is not the result of a single landowner's actions but
rather reflects the incremental contributions of a series of actors.69 An indi-
vidualized assessment of a permit application is a poor context for evaluat-
ing the harm.70 The decision to constrain a particular permittee to prevent
harm is difficult to justify until cumulative effects finally become apparent.
At that point, if it is not already too late, questions about the fair allocation
of the burdens arise, tipping the balance of values away from permit denial.
This dilemma also reflects the fact that wetlands form part of both very lo-
cal and landscape-scale processes. Section 404 has provided a limited ap-
proach for protecting at either scale.7 '
The shortcomings of section 404 described above do not mean that
individualized permitting has no role to play in wetlands conservation pol-
icy, only that it is not well-suited to protecting wetlands standing alone.
Despite the shortcomings of case-by-case permitting on its own, the need
for place-based decisions to protect the values of wetlands across the land-
scape seems clear. 72 The context and content of section 404 presents chal-
lenges and obstacles to the development of coherent policy. The challenges
are not insuperable, but we must recognize and account for them in any
attempts to develop goals and policy in the future.
67. On the broad discretion granted to the Corps, see 2 RODGERS, supra note 18, § 4.12, at 182, 185
(describing section 404 as "an extreme example of open-ended 'balancing' under casual criteria" and the
results as reflecting "a world of bargaining, negotiation, compromise").
68. Others have noted the inadequacy of section 4 04 's case-by-case permitting, standing alone, as a
means to protect wetlands. See GAO, CORPS ADMIN., supra note 9, at 2-4, 28-30, 85-86; Babcock, supra
note 11, at 318-28; Houck, War, supra note 11, at 361-74.
69. Houck, Alternatives, supra note 11, at 775-76.
70. 2 RODGERS, supra note 18, § 4.12, at 183-84; Bohlen, supra note 12, at 8; Houck, War, supra
note 11, at 361-62 (describing trade-offs with "trades [that] are poor and the rate of destruction is high"
as the outcome of the regulatory program that seeks to stop cumulative development through individual
permitting decisions).
71. See Bohlen, supra note 12, at 7-9. Initiatives for Advanced Identification of Wetlands and
Special Area Management Plans have sought to address these problems through planning to complement
individualized permitting. These programs are described in Leah V. Haygood & Robert S. Reed, Ad-
vance Planning for Wetland Protection and Management, in ISSUES IN WETLANDS PROTECTION:
BACKGROUND PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM 31-37 (1990). See
also Ben A. Wopat, The Making of the Superior SAMP, 20 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 1 (May-June
1998) (describing a SAMP case study).
72. See Bohlen, supra note 12, at 9; Oliver A. Houck, An Open Letter to EPA Administrator Wil-
liam K. Reilly, 13 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 3 (July-Aug. 1991) [hereinafter Houck, Open Letter to
Reilly] (critiquing proposal to generally classify wetlands into three groups, protecting only the group of
"highest value").
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IV. THREE CONTROVERSIES: TRACING THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM
The zigzag course set by successive administrations and section 404's
structural shortcomings tell only part of the story of section 404's evolution.
Those interested in wetlands regulation have not sat silent and idle for the
past thirty years. To the contrary, advocates have sought to influence the
direction of wetlands policy and have pursued reform of section 404
through legislative, judicial, and administrative avenues. In this section, I
briefly describe three of the most visible topics of controversy that have
surrounded the section 404 program and dominated public debate about
wetlands conservation: the Corps' jurisdiction, the technique for wetland
delineations, and the scope of activities regulated. 3 The descriptions of the
controversies locate them in relation to section 404's structural flaws, illus-
trating how the structural limitations in section 404 contributed to the endur-
ing prominence of these issues. Part IV.B. then looks closely at the nature of
these three issues to understand better why the attention devoted to these
issues has filled the policy vacuum but failed to advance the development of
goals or broader policy.
A. Endless Battles
1. Jurisdiction
Congress's lack of clarity in section 404 is reflected not only in the ab-
sence of well-expressed goals, but also in the almost Delphic statutory guid-
ance on section 404 jurisdiction. The elliptical statutory language defining
the jurisdictional reach of section 404 set the stage for ongoing jurisdic-
tional battles.74 Over the last thirty years, much time and many resources
have gone to the efforts to resolve this question.
The meaning of the key phrase "waters of the United States" has been
shaped through both judicial and administrative interpretation. Early litiga-
tion brought by environmental groups successfully challenged the Corps'
interpretation of this phrase as limited to traditionally navigable waters and
established in 1975 that the reach of section 404 extended beyond navigable
waters.75 As the Corps developed new rules to embody this interpretation,
73. These were certainly not the only controversies, but they stand out for their persistence and their
links to section 404's structural limitations. Other important topics such as mitigation and general per-
mits have been major subjects of debate and of reform efforts during this period, but they have generated
less direct conflict in the courts and Congress.
74. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2001) (prohibiting the discharge of pollutants); id. § 1362(12) (2001)
(defining discharge as the introduction into navigable waters); id. § 1344(a) (2000) (authorizing the
Secretary of the Army to issue permits for the discharge of dredged and fill material into navigable
waters); id. § 1362(7) (2001) (defining navigable waters as "waters of the United States").
75. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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Congress opened debate on amendments to the CWA. One topic debated as
part of that effort was the jurisdictional scope.7 6 Strenuous efforts to limit
the jurisdiction of section 404 to navigable waters were defeated, leaving in
place and confirming the broader reach.77 The EPA and the Corps clarified
their interpretations of section 404 jurisdiction through regulatory revisions
and guidance, including the so-called migratory bird rule, in which the EPA
asserted jurisdiction over isolated wetlands that were used or could be used
by migratory birds.78
The next round of battles centered on the narrower question whether
wetlands adjacent to open water were within the reach of waters of the
United States. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 79 the Su-
preme Court unanimously determined that the Corps' regulations extended
jurisdiction to wetlands adjacent to navigable waters and were a valid inter-
pretation of the Corps' delegated authority, consistent with congressional
intent as determined from its past actions and inaction. 80 The years follow-
ing Riverside Bayview Homes saw another challenge to the jurisdictional
reach claimed by the Corps and the EPA, this time to the assertion of juris-
diction over non-adjacent wetlands. 81 Among the several cases raising this
issue, Hoffman Homes attacked the validity of the EPA's migratory bird
rule, which asserted jurisdiction over wetlands based solely on use by mi-
gratory birds without other evidence of a connection to interstate com-
merce. 82 After an anticlimactic series of reversals in direction, the Seventh
Circuit withdrew from the field and left the issue unresolved.
The same issue was joined several years later in SWANCC, reaching the
Supreme Court in 2000.83 Once again, the petitioners challenged the validity
of the migratory bird rule under the CWA.84 This time, the Supreme Court
resolved the issue, invalidating the migratory bird rule as beyond the scope
of jurisdiction granted by Congress when applied to a wholly-intrastate iso-
lated wetland.85 The Court's 5-4 decision relied in part on its desire to avoid
any constitutional issue under the Commerce Clause, which it identified as
another potential bar to the migratory bird rule.86
76. Kalen, supra note 12, at 896 n. 122.
77. For a description of the amendments proposed and enacted, as well as subsequent failed legisla-
tive efforts to amend section 404 jurisdiction, see id. at 898-906. See also Blumm, Adolescence, supra
note 11, at 417-28. Although jurisdiction was left unchanged, the 1977 amendments introduced impor-
tant exemptions and confirmed and defined the Corps' authority to issue general permits. Id. at 430-31.
78. Definition of Waters of the United States, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986). For a more
detailed review of these developments, see Margaret N. Strand, Federal Wetlands Law, in WETLANDS
DESKBOOK 17-19 (2d ed. 1997).
79. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
80. Id. at 139.
81. See Strand, supra note 78, at 17-19.
82. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 961 F.2d 1310, 1321 (7th Cir. 1992).
83. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
84. Id. at 165.
85. Id. at 174.
86. Id. at 173-74.
[Vol. 55:3:607
Section 404 at Thirty-Something
Agency responses to the SWANCC ruling were informed by vigorous
advocacy seeking to constrain or expand the impact of the decision. Those
in favor of protecting wetlands uniformly viewed SWANCC as limited to
invalidation of the migratory bird rule.87 Those who favored less regulation
of wetlands uniformly argued that SWANCC dictated or at least invited that
all non-adjacent or isolated wetlands be withdrawn from agency efforts at
88regulation.
In the last days of the Clinton Administration, the EPA's and the Corps'
General Counsels issued guidance that followed the narrow interpretation of
SWANCC. 89 The Bush Administration announced in January 2003 that it
was rescinding this guidance and published its own guidance along with an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, soliciting comments on revisions
to section 404 jurisdictional rules in light of SWANCC.90 A leak of the draft
proposed rules in October 2003 revealed that the Bush Administration was
poised to take the opportunity to restrict jurisdiction substantially, applying
a broad reading of SWANCC.91 In response to public outcry, the newly-
appointed Administrator of the EPA announced a reversal of direction,
withdrawing the proposed rule.
The battles about statutory jurisdiction are not over. Advocates of
broader jurisdiction would undoubtedly challenge in court any rules that
threatened to narrow jurisdiction and the prior effort to adopt such rules will
be raised in the political forum that the 2004 election year provides. Should
judicial challenges, election year political pressure, or the outcome of the
election preclude efforts to narrow jurisdiction, the next logical parry by
those seeking to constrain wetlands regulation will be to pursue litigation
that finally squarely frames the constitutional challenge that lurked around
the edges of SWANCC: whether the current extent of jurisdiction exceeds
the Commerce Clause.
2. Delineation of Wetlands
The disputes over the proper technique for delineating what qualifies as
a wetland under section 404 have followed a path similar to the related de-
87. Parenteau Testimony, supra note 6 (described in Corps, EPA Mull Wetlands Regs to Address
SWANCC, supra note 46, at 24); Gary S. Guzy, Testimony Before a Hearing of the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives Comm. on Gov't Reform, Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Res. & Regulatory Affairs,
Regarding Implementation of the SWANCC Decision (Sept. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.aswm.org/fwp/swancc/gg02O9l9test.htm; Testimony of Richard Hamann, Associate in Law,
Center for Governmental Responsibility, Levin College of Law, University of Florida, Before the Senate
Comm. on Env't & Public Works, Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, Water & Wetlands (June 10, 2003)
[hereinafter Hamann Testimony].
88. Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 46, at 11,042; see also Corps, EPA Mull Wetlands Regs to
Address SWANCC, supra note 46, at 24 (describing testimony by Virginia Albrecht arguing navigation
as the only basis for jurisdiction).
89. Guzy-Andersen Memo, supra note 5.
90. Bush Admin. ANPR, supra note 4.
91. Shogren, supra note 6, at A 12.
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bate over statutory jurisdiction. 92 The struggle over the techniques and stan-
dards used to delineate areas as wetlands began in earnest with the settle-
ment of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,93 which es-
tablished that the Corps' jurisdiction extended beyond navigable waters.94
At that time, the Corps adopted a definition of the term "wetlands." That
definition, which remains in force today, designates as wetlands: "[a]reas
that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency
and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated
soil conditions." 95
Although there have been efforts to challenge even this definition,9 6 the
focus of greater attention have been the standards that operationalize the
definition and the tests employed by delineators to determine whether a
particular area falls within the general definition.
As the Corps and the EPA matured in the 1970s and 1980s, they devel-
oped distinct approaches to delineation, as did other agencies with roles in
wetlands permitting, such as the Fish and Wildlife Service. The interagency
cooperation that developed in the late 1980s led to an interagency effort to
develop a common delineation manual that would govern delineation not
only by the Corps and the EPA, but also by the Fish and Wildlife Service
and the Soil Conservation Service.97 The adoption of a new manual that
broadened agency jurisdiction, concurrent with other interagency initiatives
that emphasized vigorous implementation of section 404, and the newly-
adopted "no net loss" goal led to a backlash from agricultural, oil and gas,
and development interests.
98
A major focus of criticism was the assertion of jurisdiction over drier-
end, altered, and artificial wetlands. 99 After the Corps held hearings to air
the criticisms, the momentum for revised delineation criteria sparked both
legislative and executive proposals. On August 14, 1991, the agencies re-
leased a revised manual for public comment. 1°° The revised manual
emerged from an intensely political atmosphere and process and engendered
92. As befits a debate over an agency manual, the debate over delineation has resided less in the
courts than has the debate over interpretation of the statutory grant of jurisdiction. Instead, the battles
over delineation methodology have been fought largely within the executive branch with some congres-
sional involvement.
93. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
94. Id.
95. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2003).
96. See, e.g., the 1991 Hayes-Breaux bill described in Denis Collins Swords, The Comprehensive
Wetlands Conservation and Management Act of 1991: A Restructuring of Section 404 that Affords
Inadequate Protection for Critical Wetlands, 53 LA. L. REV. 163, 182-83 (1992).
97. FED. INTERAGENCY COMM. FOR WETLAND DELINEATION, FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING
AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS (1989) [hereinafter 1989 MANUAL]. The common
manual drew from the manuals previously used by the various agencies. See Babcock, supra note 11, at
342 n.170.
98. See Babcock, supra note 11, at 343-44.
99. Kusler, supra note 17, at 11. Other criticisms included failure by the agencies to solicit adequate
public comment and the manual's complexity for end users. Id.
100. 56 Fed. Reg. 40,446 (Aug. 14, 1991).
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criticisms equal in vigor, if different in content, from those that met its
predecessor.'0 ' Advocates on all sides focused intense energy on determin-
ing the merits and limitations of the new proposed manual. Critics noted
that the 1991 manual lacked scientific validity and consistency.,0 2 It was
unworkable in the field and when scientists field tested it, they estimated
that delineation required three- to five-fold the time demanded by existing
practice. 0 3 Moreover, field testing by a broad cross section of the scientific
community revealed the dramatic impact that its implementation would
have on jurisdiction-excluding 30% to 80% of the wetlands covered by the
Corps' 1987 manual. 1°4
Meanwhile, in response to the backlash against the 1989 Manual, the
EPA issued guidance and the Corps developed its prior converted croplands
exclusion in an effort to prevent wholesale elimination of section 404.105
The political battle over delineation prompted numerous legislative initia-
tives in the 102nd Congress, almost all of which ultimately failed. 0 6 A
measure did pass that prohibited the Corps from spending money to imple-
ment the 1989 Manual unless it was subjected to notice and comment under
the Administrative Procedure Act.'0 7 Therefore the Corps reverted to its
1987 Manual, while the EPA continued to use the 1989 Manual. 0 8 Thus,
the battle ended with a stalemate and no gain in clarity.
3. The Scope of Activities Regulated by Section 404
A third controversy that has generated more heat than light is the range
of activities subject to regulation under section 404. Since the CWA's en-
actment, the phrase "discharge of dredged or fill materials" has been exam-
ined in numerous court and agency decisions. The result has been that a
hodgepodge of activities falls within the Corps' jurisdiction while others
escape regulation. Activities that harm wetlands, like land clearing and
dredging, partially avoid Corps oversight because of semantic distinctions
that seem disconnected from any policy or goal. As with jurisdiction and
delineation, the Corps' stated policy moves back and forth, leaving no issue
ever truly settled and wetlands facing a continually uncertain future.
One of the earliest battles centered on section 404's effect on land clear-
ing. Two Fifth Circuit decisions in 1983 delineated when land clearing in-
vokes Corps' jurisdiction. In Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v.
Marsh,'°9 the court held that land clearing for agricultural conversion tends
101. Babcock, supra note II, at 346 n. 186; Kusler, supra note 17, at 33.
102. Kusler, supra note 17, at 33.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 34.
105. See Babcock, supra note I I, at 347-49.
106. WANT, supra note 16, § 4:53, at 4-40.
107. Id. § 4:54, at 4-41.
108. Id. § 4:53, at 4-41.
109. 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
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to violate section 404 if it involves land leveling or substantial earth moving
within Corps' jurisdictional areas.11 0 The landowners had attempted to con-
vert forest land into a soybean farm by using bulldozers to cut the timber
and vegetation at ground level, pushing the felled trees into windrows, burn-
ing the windrowed vegetation, and discing or burying the remaining mate-
rial. 1 ' The court determined that this form of land clearing involved the
deposit of fill materials because sloughs were filled and the land was gener-
ally leveled in the process.'2
However, in Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands, 1 3 the court indicated
that land clearing does not per se violate section 404.114 According to the
court, a power company's removal of trees in a wetland to install power
lines does not involve the discharge of dredged or fill material." 5 In
Avoyelles, the work would have permanently converted the wetlands into
agricultural land, while in Save Our Wetlands, the cleared trees and vegeta-
tion would be allowed to deteriorate naturally, simply transforming the
wooded swampland into another variety of swampland. 11
6
In response to the Avoyelles case, the Corps issued a Regulatory Guid-
ance Letter stating that a permit would be required for land-clearing activi-
ties in waters of the United States that involve more than de minimis dis-
charges.1 17 Approximately five years later, the Corps issued another Regula-
tory Guidance Letter adopting the position that most mechanized land-
clearing operations in wetlands are subject to section 404 jurisdiction be-
cause they involve some redeposition of soil. 1 8 Then in 1993, revisions to
the Corps' regulations provided that the discharge of dredged material
means any addition of dredged material into waters of the United States that
is incidental to any activity, including mechanized land clearing. "9
During the past ten years, judicial challenges and regulatory changes
have continued to affect the Corps' jurisdiction over land clearing. Closely
tied to land clearing, and thus also affected by these same changes, are
dredging activities. Because dredging, as opposed to the discharge of
dredged material, is not explicitly covered by the CWA, case law and the
110. Id. at 930.
111. Id. at 920-21.
112. Id. at 924.
113. 711 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1983).
114. Id. at 647.
115. To distinguish the Avoyelles decision, the court relied heavily on the Corps' definition of "fill
material as any material used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or
changing the bottom elevation of a water-body." Id.; 33 C.F.R § 323.2(m) (1979).
116. Save Our Wetlands, 711 F.2d at 647.
117. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 85-4: "Avoyelles" (Mar. 29,
1985). The Corps did not change its policy on the mere removal of vegetation from land, which required
no permit.
118. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 90-5: "Landclearing Activities
Subject to Section 404 Jurisdiction" (July 18, 1990).
119. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1993). Not included is the incidental addition of dredged material
that does not destroy or degrade wetlands, but the burden is on the landowner to prove this. Id. §
323.3(d)(3)(i) (1993).
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Corps' regulatory policy on this practice have continually shifted. The
Avoyelles court had not confronted the question of whether the discharge of
dredged materials is subject to Corps jurisdiction because it concluded that
the discharges at issue were discharges of fill material. 20 However, in 1986
the Corps issued a regulation expressly excluding from regulation "de mini-
mis, incidental soil movement occurring during normal dredging opera-
tions." 12' Environmental groups challenged the rule because it failed to re-
quire a section 404 permit for the mechanized land clearing of some wet-
lands. 22 The parties ultimately settled the case, and from the terms of set-
tlement, the Corps developed the Tulloch Rule in 1993.123 The rule asserted
jurisdiction over excavation (including mechanized land clearing) that re-
sults in the redeposit or fallback of dredged or excavated material, regard-
less of quantity, into a wetland or other water of the United States. 2 4 Permit
exemptions were available in limited circumstances. 1
25
Industry groups challenged the Tulloch Rule on the ground that it ex-
ceeded the authority of the Corps and the EPA under the CWA. 126 The
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that "by asserting jurisdiction
over 'any redeposit,' including incidental fallback, the Tulloch Rule outruns
the Corps's statutory authority."' 127 In reaching this conclusion, the court
stated:
[T]he straightforward statutory term "addition" cannot reasonably
be said to encompass the situation in which material is removed
from the waters of the United States and a small portion of it hap-
pens to fall back. Because incidental fallback represents a net with-
drawal, not an addition, of material, it cannot be a discharge.
28
Responding to the ruling, the Corps and the EPA promulgated new
regulations in 1999 that expressly exclude "incidental fallback" from the
definition of "discharge of dredged material."'' 29 In 2001, the agencies
120. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1983).
121. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,232
(Nov. 13, 1986).
122. N.C. Wildlife Fed'n v. Tulloch, No. C90-713-CIV-5-B (E.D.N.C. 1992).
123. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (1993).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 232.2(4)(ii) (exemptions existed for activities involving an absence of an impact and "nor-
mal dredging operations" in navigable waters).
126. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
127. Id. at 1405.
128. Id. at 1404. The court noted that a redeposit could be subject to section 404 permit requirements
in some instances, such as where the redeposit took place in a different area from where it was obtained
or was sidecast onto wetlands. ld. at 1407. See Borden Ranch P'ship, 261 F.3d. 810 (9th Cir. 2001), affd
by an equally divided court, 537 U.S. 99 (2002) (holding that moving existing soil within a wetlands
through "deep ripping" does invoke Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA); United States v. Deaton, 209
F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that sidecasting dredged spoil is not incidental fallback that escapes
regulation).
129. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (1999). In the preamble, the agencies stated that the change did not alter the
doctrine that some redeposits constitute a discharge of dredged material. Therefore, whether a redeposit
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moved toward recovering the jurisdictional reach they enjoyed under the
original Tulloch Rule.' 30 While declining to create a rebuttable presumption,
the agencies stated that they regarded mechanized land-clearing, ditching,
channelization, in-stream mining, or other mechanized excavation activity
in the waters of the United States as resulting in a discharge unless project-
specific evidence showed only incidental fallback.131 Second, they inter-
preted "incidental fallback" narrowly as "the redeposit of small volumes of
dredged material that is incidental to excavation activity in waters of the
United States when such material falls back to substantially the same place
as the initial removal."'
132
Other activities that have been subject to battles over the scope of the
Corps' authority, but to a lesser extent, include draining, ditching, farming
operations, placing pilings, and creating landfills. Draining is responsible
for a large percentage of annual wetland loss. A policy focused squarely on
wetland conservation and the goals of the CWA would seek to regulate this
activity. However, by its terms, section 404 only regulates draining if it in-
volves a discharge of dredged or fill material into jurisdictional waters.' 33 A
memorandum issued by the Corps attempts to narrow the exemption for
drainage by stating that drainage occurring after December 1985 does not
create a new set of "normal circumstances" for purposes of determining
whether the area qualifies as wetlands.134 Thus, the wetland would still meet
the vegetative criterion in the definition of wetland if it would have sup-
ported wetland vegetation prior to draining, even if it no longer supports
wetland vegetation after draining.
The construction of drainage ditches is often the means of converting
wetlands into drier, more commercially-usable land. The Corps' jurisdiction
over drainage ditches is generally dependent on whether the ditch is con-
structed in a jurisdictional area or in uplands. Drainage ditches built in ju-
risdictional areas will remain jurisdictional if an ordinary high water mark
remains present, even if the surrounding land becomes dry.' 35 Meanwhile,
drainage ditches constructed in uplands may enter the Corps' jurisdiction if
they constitute a surface water connection between two waters of the United
States and an ordinary high water mark is present. 136 Exemptions do exist,
particularly for those ditches connected to farming or forestry operations. 1
37
required a section 404 permit would be determined on a case-by-case basis. 64 Fed. Reg. 25,120-21
(May 10, 1999).
130. See 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2001).
131. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(i).
132. Id. § 232.2(2)(ii)(2).
133. The Fifth Circuit upheld this view in a 1992 case, ruling that drainage per se is not subject to the
section 404 permit requirement. Save Our Cmty. v. EPA, 971 F.2d 1155, 1167 (5th Cir. 1992).
134. WANT, supra note 16, § 4:53, at 4-30 (citing memorandum to all Division and District Counsel
from Lance Wood, Assistant Chief Counsel (Apr. 10, 1990)).
135.Final Notice of Issuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,818, 12,823
(Mar. 9, 2000).
136. Id. at 12,823-24.
137. Id.
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Another important area of contention is activities undertaken in connec-
tion with farming. Historically, farming activities have resulted in the loss
of a large percentage of wetlands, yet often these activities go unregulated.
In the regulations developed by the Corps in response to the Callaway deci-
sion, 38 normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities, such as seed-
ing and plowing, were exempted from the definition of "dredged and fill
material.' 39 Then as part of the 1977 CWA amendments, Congress created
similar categorical exemptions for these activities.140 But the exemptions
were not available if the discharges were "incidental to any activity having
as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it
was not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable wa-
ters may be impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced."' 41 The courts,
the Corps, and the EPA have construed the exemptions narrowly. 1
42
Pilings pose another contentious area for the Corps' jurisdiction. Be-
cause they are not placed for the "primary purpose" of eliminating wetlands
or other waters, for many years they escaped the Corps' regulation because
they did not constitute "fill material.' 43 The Corps eventually conceded that
a permit would be necessary if piles were used equivalently to fill. 44 Two
years later, the Corps clarified its position because of the increasing use of
pilings in place of fill material to avoid regulation under the CWA.
145
Thereafter, permits were required when pilings had the physical effect of
fill1 4 6 or when they had the functional use and effect of fill. 4 7 In 1993, the
Corps revised its regulations to reflect the circumstances where piling in-
stallation would require a section 404 permit. 
48
Finally, the disposal of solid waste is an activity that has aroused some
debate over whether the Corps has jurisdiction. In 1998, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the Corps does not have the authority to require a permit for the
138. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
139. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,325 (1975) (originally codified at 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(4) & (6)).
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0 (1977).
141. Id. § 1344(f)(2).
142. See generally United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that prior use of
land for farming did not allow for application of "normal farming activities" exemption because activity
was not "ongoing" as hydrological modifications were needed to resume farming operations); United
States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76, 85-86 n.23 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (holding that cultivation or logging of
wetlands before beaver entered and upset natural drainage did not constitute use as to which land was
"previously subject" for purpose of determining whether farm exception applied).
143. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 88-14: "Applicability of Section
404 to Piles" (Nov. 7, 1988).
144. Id. (addressing situations where "piles are placed so close together that they effectively replace
an aquatic area and create a fill for the primary purpose of converting the aquatic area to dry land").
145. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 90-8: "Applicability of Section
404 to Pilings" (Dec. 14, 1990).
146. Id. Examples include pilings placed for dams, dikes, other structures utilizing densely-spaced
pilings, or as a foundation for large structures.
147. Id. Examples include pilings placed to facilitate the construction of office and industrial devel-
opments, parking structures, restaurants, stores, and similar structures.
148. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(c) (1993) (indicating that permits are needed when, for example, the pilings
are so closely spaced that sedimentation rates would be increased or the placement of pilings would
reduce the reach or impair the circulation of waters of the United States).
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placement of a landfill in wetlands. 49 As noted by the court, the CWA
grants the Corps authority over the discharge of "dredged or fill material,"
while the EPA has authority over the disposal of solid wastes.150 Addition-
ally, the EPA had issued regulations for solid waste landfills in accordance
with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, along with wetland
regulations that mirror the EPA's section 404 guidelines concerning wet-
lands under the CWA.' 5' Therefore, the EPA and states with approved solid
waste permitting programs were determined to be the proper authorities to
regulate the placement of landfill in wetlands.'52
B. The Impact on Policy Development
1. Section 404 Jurisdiction and Delineation of Wetlands153
"Define a thing and you can dispense with it, right?"'
54
Questions about what areas Congress intended to regulate and how to
delineate the areas regulated by the statute have occupied a disproportionate
share of public attention. Yet given the structural flaws of section 404, de-
bate over the statute's geographic reach seems logical, natural, and indeed,
perhaps inevitable. Congress's elliptical language and the lack of a clear
statutory goal invited arguments about how to interpret jurisdiction. The
tension between the Corps and the EPA fueled the battle over jurisdiction.
Added to this, section 404's design as a pollution control statute that re-
quired permits for discharges of pollutants into the "waters of the United
States" and completely excluded any "non-waters" from regulation invested
the interpretation of the jurisdictional reach with enormous significance.
Unlike a program that focused on protection of wetlands resources or their
functions and values, section 404 focused on regulating activities occurring
within a defined jurisdictional realm: waters.
As with conflict over jurisdiction, the roots of the delineation contro-
versy can be traced to the inherent limitations of section 404. The lack of a
clearly-defined goal related to wetlands provided no guidance on how to
approach delineation. The different cultures and missions of the Corps and
the EPA produced different approaches to delineation. And the reliance on a
water statute made the water aspect of wetlands a topic of particular conten-
tion, engendering opposition to delineation protocols that included drier-end
wetlands.
149. Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 151 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1998).
150. Id. at 1165-67.
151. Id. at 1167-68.
152. Id. at 1169.
153. Because the nature of the problems created by the focus on jurisdiction and delineation are
similar, the two are discussed together in this part.
154. RICHARD FARINA, BEEN DOWN So LONG IT LOOKS LIKE UP TO ME 39 (1966).
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Moreover, debate about these questions seems a logical focus for advo-
cates seeking to influence wetlands policy. From the perspective of an ad-
vocate interested in large-scale impact, the stakes in both the jurisdictional
and delineation conflict are enormous. If sheer acreage subject to regulation
is the concern, control of the definition of waters subject to the statute and
of the method for delineating a wetland promises to have a direct and sig-
nificant impact. Thus, debate over both jurisdiction and delineation method-
ology seems inevitable. Further, these issues are technically challenging.
The scientific and policy challenge of developing a single methodology for
delineating wetlands throughout the country quickly and at a reasonable
cost is considerable. That this would present a challenge, engender a variety
of views and approaches, and necessitate some trial and error seems reason-
able.
But beyond their technical difficulty and the potential for leverage these
issues offer, these controversies have endured because they are not purely
technical questions but also encode basic questions about our values, our
policy. Conflicts over jurisdiction and delineation both indirectly express
the central ambiguity that wetlands present us: are they land or water?
55
Those who would alter wetlands argue for treating them as land and remov-
ing them from section 404's jurisdictional reach by drawing a jurisdictional
line close to the water's edge.156 They would legally and semantically "re-
claim" areas that are relatively dry or far from open water as a preface to
physical reclamation. Those who wish to preserve the ecological value of
wetlands emphasize the ecological imperative of connectivity, wetlands'
role as part of the broader hydrologic system, and their direct role in water
pollution control.157 They seek a broader jurisdiction for section 404 that
encompasses isolated and drier-end wetlands and focus on the lack of a sci-
entific basis to distinguish among the parts of the hydrologic system based
on proximity to open water or absolute wetness alone. Thus, the conflict
over wetlands' status as land or water encodes a conflict about the nature
and extent of our concern for wetlands-about their value.
A definitional debate is not an adequate substitute for a debate on the
underlying value questions, and debating these questions in the context of
jurisdictional and delineation may not be a neutral strategy. It may have
differential advantage for advocates who oppose regulation in relation to
those seeking to protect wetlands for several reasons. First, a focus on defi-
nitions and jurisdiction submerges the conflict over the value of wetlands, a
key value conflict that animates debate under section 404. It perpetuates the
myth that there is no conflict about values: that no one favors diminished
155. See Kusler, supra note 17, at 10.
156. Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 46, at 11,048-49, 11,055-56 (indicating that any jurisdiction
outside of navigable waters must be justified by clear congressional expression of intent); Deely &
Latham, supra note 46, at 966 (noting characterization of section 404 program as a "land grab" and
defining its jurisdictional reach with reference to navigable waters).
157. Hamann Testimony, supra note 87, at I; Parenteau Testimony, supra note 6, at 7-8.
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protection of wetlands. In a battle about delineation or jurisdiction, the ar-
gument is cast as technical-scientific or statutory, as the case may be-but
not as an argument about values. The alignment of one's values with the
scientific or legal argument raised is generally treated as a coincidence, not
worthy of mention or attention. The arguments over jurisdiction and de-
lineation serve to hide the values that underlie the debate on both sides. In
light of broad public support for enhanced protection of the environment,
this seems more likely to advantage those who seek to limit regulation by
restricting public debate and engagement on the relative importance of the
values affected.
One can claim to value wetlands as much as the most ardent advocate of
wetlands protection while simultaneously seeking to redefine what consti-
tutes a wetland or "waters of the United States." It is harder to maintain
one's claim to value wetlands while opposing regulation directly. Moreover,
the narrowing of regulation's reach that can be achieved through contests
over jurisdiction and delineation accurately reflects the goal of those who
oppose regulation: no one opposing wetland regulation seeks to remove all
wetlands from protection. Thus, battles focused on jurisdiction are well-
suited to the goal of carving out from section 404 jurisdiction those wet-
lands'that share the fewest or least visible characteristics of water. 1
58
The focus on jurisdiction may fit well with an agenda to broaden regula-
tion's scope incrementally, but it does not fit similarly well with an agenda
to focus broadly on wetlands conservation. If we examine closely the battles
over jurisdiction and delineation, their distorting effect goes beyond merely
disguising important value choices. While delineation retains the aura of a
scientific and technical question, the debate quickly moves from the techni-
cal into generalizations about wetland functions and values. In place of a
comprehensive discussion about values and functions, delineation standards
and methods are justified with reference to the presence or absence of se-
lected attributes that are implicitly singled out as the prime source of wet-
lands value. For example, both in the 1991 manual and in related legislative
proposals, the number of days of saturation at the surface emerged as a key
attribute.
The arguments raised in this context may rely on unscientific generali-
zations about the attributes that give rise to wetlands' value. For example,
arguments for a narrow jurisdictional limit or delineation protocol fre-
quently incorporate a general claim that the wetlands excluded do not pro-
vide the same functions or values as those retained within agency jurisdic-
tion or that they are unnatural.159 The factual basis for such claims has typi-
158. This is not to suggest that these conflicts always result in victories for those seeking to narrow
jurisdiction, only that a victory in a jurisdictional or delineation battle fits well with the goals of a party
seeking to narrow jurisdiction.
159. See Ditches Are Tributaries Under CWA, 4th Circuit Finds, ENDANGERED SPECIES &
WETLANDS REP., June 2003, at 4 [hereinafter Ditches are Tributaries], which quotes National Associa-
tion of Home Builders Executive Vice President and CEO Jerry Howard criticizing the Fourth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Deaton:
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cally been that the wetlands to be excluded are dry most of the time, iso-
lated, or altered by human activity.6° Without making the supporting points
explicit, the arguments rely on three premises: (1) that wetlands' only rele-
vant values are their wetness or their proximity to open water, (2) that more
wetness or closer proximity to water translates perfectly into higher value,
and (3) that areas altered by human activity lose all value and justification
for regulation under section 404.
The scientific community has consistently failed to accept these equa-
tions,16 as have the Supreme Court and most Circuit Courts of Appeal to
date. 62 But because of the narrow technical scope of debate, courts and
advocates nevertheless often focus disproportionately on quantifiable attrib-
utes such as wetness or proximity to water as measures of quality in place of
a broader, more nuanced focus on the many ways that the presence, and
even absence, of water can have value. 163 The timing of water's presence, a
wetland's context in the landscape, and other subtler attributes are less eas-
ily captured, quantified, and evaluated.164 Moreover, the essential role
Congress never intended for [Section 404 to reach] ordinary rural roadside drainage ditches,
which are ubiquitous .... The environmental value of manmade ditches that are clogged with
vegetation and floating leaves for just a few weeks and dry during the rest of the year should
not be comparable to, and in some cases exceed the environmental value of streams that run
into the Chesapeake Bay.
Id. See also FD&P Enters., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 517
(D.N.J. 2003) (stating test for jurisdiction of non-adjacent wetlands as substantial nexus to navigable
waters demonstrated by proof that filling wetlands will harm navigable waters).
160. See United States v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780, 786-89 (E.D. Va. 2002) (rejecting sea-
sonal, periodic flow as establishing an adequate hydrologic connection for adjacency and rejecting
Corps' claims to jurisdiction landward of OHWM); United States v. Newdunn Assocs., 195 F. Supp. 2d
751, 758 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd by Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding
that wetlands "were non-tidal high elevation hydric soil flats" that were "less functional than wetlands
that lay closer to navigable" water); Deely & Latham, supra note 46, at 966; Ditches Are Tributaries,
supra note 159, at 4.
161. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., WETLANDS: CHARACTERISTICS AND
BOUNDARIES (1995); Kusler, supra note 17, at 30-33.
162. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 129-30, 133-35 (1985) (rejecting
argument that surface saturation or inundation was required by Corps regulations and emphasizing value
of wetlands that are not saturated or inundated); Treacy, 344 F.3d at 410, 417 (upholding jurisdiction
although hydrologic connection between navigable water and wetland at issue presently runs through 2.4
miles that includes man-made ditches and in which the flow is intermittent); United States v. Deaton,
332 F.3d 698, 702, 708 (4th Cir. 2003) (upholding jurisdiction over wetlands bordering a roadside ditch
that connected to the Chesapeake Bay via a thirty-two-mile path, with eight miles separating the wet-
lands from the closest navigable-in-fact water). The District Court in the case made findings of fact
which emphasized lower functionality of wetlands at issue. See Newdunn Assocs., 195 F. Supp. at 758;
United States v. Rapanos, 339 F. 3d 447, 451-53 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasizing hydrologic connection
and that passage of water through a man-made ditch does not negate jurisdiction).
163. See Timothy D. Searchinger, Wetlands Issues 1993: Challenges and a New Approach, 4 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 13, 27 (1992-93).
164. On the difficulty of assessing wetland values and functions and the challenge to develop uni-
form assessment methodology, see Jon Kusler & William Niering, Wetland Assessment: Have We Lost
Our Way?, 20 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. I (Mar.-Apr. 1998); Noelle Haner-Dorr, All Wet: State Blasts
Land Rules, ORLANDO BUS. J. (May 20, 2002), available at
http://orlando.bizjoumals.comorlando/stories/2002105/20/story2.htm (describing lack of success by
Florida in developing a uniform assessment methodology). On the importance of considering a wide
range of values in assessing the adequacy of mitigation, see Dennis M. King & Luke W. Herbert, The
Fungibili4, of Wetlands, 19 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 10 (Sept.-Oct. 1997).
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played by wetlands when they are dry-their capacity to accommodate,
hold, and move water-is overshadowed by the focus on wetness and prox-
imity to water. Wetlands' periodic dryness becomes a shortcoming in place
of a virtue. The temptation is strong to focus on a narrow array of character-
istics (e.g., wetness and proximity) and to exclude consideration of a whole
host of values and functions wetlands serve, including biodiversity, aes-
thetic, cultural, recreational, and spiritual values. These are swept out of the
debate, neither sufficiently technical nor sufficiently as easily-applied stan-
dards for defining wetlands' boundaries.
The very decision to focus primarily on delineation is thus ultimately
value-laden. To join issue over what areas are properly defined as wetlands
engages debate on the task of drawing boundaries, of categorizing. Solving
these challenges demands that we identify what is uniform and static about
wetlands and what can be identified and assessed in a workable delineation
method. 165 The varied, dynamic, and periodic aspects of wetlands inevitably
prove harder to trap in a definition or a workable delineation method. 66
Absent from and obscured by the debate about delineation is open discus-
sion of the purpose for which we are defining wetlands' reach. Yet this is
critical to settling the question of the proper boundary to set. Determining
why we regulate wetlands, with what goal, is key to determining an appro-
priate delineation method or jurisdictional boundary. For example, if the
purpose of delineation were to determine what areas are unsafe in their pre-
sent condition for construction of dwellings, or for location of septic tanks,
many people who urge a narrow definition would willingly accept a broader
delineation. 167 The purpose of regulation and its objective are relevant to
determining how we define wetlands' bounds.
Instead of discussing the appropriate goal, we debate the appropriate de-
lineation technique, conducting a coded and necessarily imprecise dialogue
about the value of wetlands and the goals of regulation. The debate on defi-
nitions is likely to continue unabated and unresolved until we clarify the
underlying purpose that delineation serves. The ground on which the battles
over jurisdiction and delineation are fought offers little possibility for clari-
fying national goals or policy. The two outcomes possible from debates
over delineation are to speed loss of wetlands or to slow it somewhat fur-
ther. As Part V of this Article suggests, whatever the outcome of these ar-
guments, the rate of loss is significant. The 1991 delineation manual could
have exposed millions of acres by the stroke of a pen. Proposed but with-
drawn regulatory revisions in the wake of SWANCC promised to do the
165. Although I maintain that the debate over jurisdiction ultimately favors a focus on a narrow range
of quantifiable attributes, the results of litigation over jurisdiction has not uniformly narrowed the range
of the agency's exercise of its authority. The landmark case of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.C. Cir. 1975), for example, focused on the proper scope of jurisdiction
and resulted in a significant expansion of the Corps' recognized jurisdiction.
166. See Kusler, supra note 17, at 30.
167. Id. at 10.
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same. The endless war over delineation and jurisdiction will never create a
context likely to produce a discussion of national goals and policy.
2. Activities Regulated by Section 404
The legacy of controversy over which activities fall under section 404
reflects one of section 404's structural limitations in particular: the adoption
of a pollution control approach. As with jurisdiction and delineation, it is
logical that we have had controversy over what activities are covered by
section 404 in implementing the statute, given the statute's inherent limita-
tions. The focus on what constitutes the discharge of dredged and fill mate-
rial seems to generate endless questions that distract energy from a broader
focus on goals and policy development. The questions are sometimes mean-
ingless in relation to wetlands policy because they lack a direct correlation
with achieving wetlands conservation.
As with the debates over jurisdiction and delineation, the outside limits
of debate are narrowed when conflict focuses on the activities regulated as
discharges under section 404. Even broadly interpreted, the scope of activi-
ties subject to regulation under section 404 is widely acknowledged to be
inadequate to achieve wetland conservation. These conflicts offer no prom-
ise of a context for developing coherent wetlands policy. The focus is en-
tirely on determining which methods employed to intentionally alter wet-
lands will be regulated. The question is not even which methods should be
prohibited, only which should be subject to a permit requirement. Thus,
section 404's pollution control approach operates like a broad mesh sieve,
allowing many categories of degrading activities to escape regulatory re-
view altogether. Even those activities subject to permitting requirements
will often be permitted.
The controversies spawned by section 404's focus on specific polluting
activities may also provide a distorted context for considering wetlands pol-
icy. Value conflicts are projected onto technical questions about whether
various dredging or land clearing practices entail a discharge. As with juris-
diction and delineation controversies, these tend to flatten the core value
questions into disputes about landowners' rights and technical rules.
Nonetheless, as with jurisdiction and delineation, the stakes are high,
generating conflict. Advocates have targeted litigation to address those ac-
tivities that are most likely to produce significant rewards from their par-
ticular perspective. The resources devoted to litigating the Tulloch Rule, for
example, reflect the broad impact this issue has. While we may recognize
the practical importance of this issue, it is important to remain mindful that
these conflicts only slow or speed the steady loss of wetlands and move us
no closer to developing a coherent policy.
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V. FACTS WE KNOW AND FAIL TO LOVE
"Keats said a long time ago, 'a fact is not a truth until you love it.
''168
In the thirty years that advocates and administrations have struggled to
gain control over section 404's direction indirectly, we have managed to
ignore important facts-facts that are almost too obvious to bear repeating
at this late date. These facts fall into two categories: (1) facts relevant to the
values and priority we assign wetland conservation in relation to other val-
ues, and (2) facts that document our current practices and their impact. In
part, the failure to consider these facts results from the focus on the distract-
ing battles described above, in place of consideration of the broader ques-
tions of what we are doing and what we value. Perhaps through excessive
familiarity these facts have also become banal and we cease to be aware of
them or are numb to their power. Perhaps we ignore them because the chal-
lenge they imply places too much at risk to bear thinking, the strategy they
suggest is outside the range of what we are willing to gamble. In short, per-
haps we fail to love them. Whatever the reason for our failure to embrace
these facts, acting on them as truths represents a key to developing a suc-
cessful conservation policy for wetlands.
A. The Value of Wetlands
The facts regarding the value of wetlands are so often repeated as to be
commonplace. They are well established scientifically and largely unchal-
lenged. Wetlands provide fish and wildlife habitat, essential breeding and
nursery areas for many species including economically-important shellfish,
and habitat and food for migrating birds; water supply protection through
recharge; water quality protection through purification; flood control; ero-
sion and shoreline protection by binding stream banks and absorbing wave
energy; outdoor recreation opportunities for hunters and bird and wildlife
watchers; and education and research benefits. 169 Endangered species' use
of and reliance on wetlands has been documented. 170 A recent study docu-
ments a less-often-touted value and service provided by wetlands: that wet-
lands have significant effects on climate by moderating temperatures and
protecting agricultural areas from freezes that damage crops.171
168. Richard Tillinghast, An Interview with Shelby Foote, PLOUGHSHARES LITERARY J., Fall 1993,
available at http://www.pshares.org/issues/articlePrint.cfm?prmArticlelD=1525.htm (quoting Shelby
Foote).
169. MARK S. DENNISON & JAMES F. BERRY, WETLANDS: GUIDE TO SCIENCE, LAW AND
TECHNOLOGY 55-63 (1993); WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, STATEWIDE WETLANDS STRATEGIES: A GUIDE
TO PROTECTING AND MANAGING THE RESOURCE 4-6 (1992). Presidential candidate George H.W. Bush
was restating these in early 1992. See A Presidential Wetlands Debate, 14 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 5
(May-June 1992).
170. U.S. EPA, WETLANDS: FISH AND WILDLIFE HABITAT (July 2002), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/fish.html.
171. Curtis H. Marshall et al., The Impact of Anthropogenci Land-Cover Change on the Florida
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These facts point to an impressive array of values that bridge the eco-
nomic and the aesthetic. We value the functions and services wetlands pro-
vide to broader ecosystems-both those functions and services that benefit
humans directly (e.g., flood control and water purification) and those that
may provide more indirect or intangible benefits (e.g., fish and wildlife
habitat for species that have no economic or recreational value but which
we value). There may be disagreement about why we care about these val-
ues-whether out of utilitarian impulses or an instinct to respect the intrin-
sic value of fish, wildlife, and the ecosystems on which they depend, for
example. But the values themselves and the facts underlying these values
are uncontested.
Although in general it is the opponents of wetlands regulation who
claim fairness as a value they seek to protect, 172 there are claims that dis-
tributive justice or fairness is promoted by wetland protection, too. If a
landowner externalizes costs to the rest of society when she destroys wet-
lands in order to profit herself, this can be claimed to be not only inefficient
but also unfair, just as any pollution imposed on the public is.173
Of course, knowing the values associated with protection of wetlands
does not resolve the question of what our goal is or should be under section
404 or dictate our policies. One challenge is knowing how to weigh these
intangible attributes and non-market services provided by wetlands against
other conflicting values, especially those that can be expressed in dollars
and cents. 174 But the bare facts that we do know are significant: that wet-
lands provide defined services and have known attributes that we value.
B. Values in Conflict with the Protection of Wetlands
Wetlands regulation is a continual source of conflict in part because
there are values that stand in direct conflict with the values found in wet-
lands. Unlike the values associated with wetlands, these values have most
often been expressed indirectly, in the form of a claim of a legal right-a
property right-rather than as an assertion of values. This often expressed
concern for private property rights has largely failed to prevail in the courts
and in Congress, leaving intact the government's legal right to regulate
dredge and fill activities without compensating landowners unless the con-
stitutional threshold for a taking is passed. Property rights advocates' strat-
Peninsula: Sea Breezes and Warm Season Sensible Weather, 132 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 28 (2003).
172. For the more commonly raised claim that regulation is in conflict with fairness and the contro-
verted facts underlying both sets of claims, see "Values in Conflict with the Protection of Wetlands,"
infra. Part V.B.
173. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the Development of
Federal Environmental Criminal Law, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251,268 (1993).
174. James Salzman, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV.
607 (2000) (discussing the value of efforts to monetize the benefits provided by wetlands and other
natural systems); James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law,
20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 312 (2001).
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egy of claiming a right has often obscured the values that they seek to as-
sert. 175 The polarized conflict has failed to provide a sound debate about the
nature of the competing values. Neither ignoring the effects of regulation on
landowners, as advocates of conservation may, nor attempting to establish
the values at stake through sympathetic anecdotes, as advocates of property
rights may, provides the full picture we need if we are to develop a sound
policy. The concern for property rights can be translated as expressing three
core values-landowners' concern for their autonomy, for their well-being,
and for fairness, each of which may be implicated in a given case. Closer
consideration of these values is an important aspect of developing a sound
wetlands policy.
Autonomy in this context is the value of freedom to act without gov-
ernment interference on wetlands one owns. Autonomy is a value that fre-
quently stands in conflict with the values advanced by environmental regu-
lation, and it is at its strongest where the regulation affects activity on pri-
vate lands, as with regulation under section 404. Where an individual seeks
to engage in activities and regulation prevents or alters those plans, the
landowner's autonomy is directly affected.
However, in many cases, the activities are undertaken not by individuals
but by economic entities such as corporations. To the extent that corporate
actors undertake to dredge or fill wetlands, it is more difficult to claim that
the value at stake is autonomy since the corporation is not a human. One
response to this problem is to focus on the autonomy of the shareholders of
the corporation whose activities are regulated. 176 Adopting this view, the
directors and officers of the corporation act as fiduciaries for the sharehold-
ers, and, therefore, they seek to assert and protect the shareholders' interest
in autonomy.
As a practical matter, this characterization seems to stretch the fiction of
the corporate form too far in most situations, except perhaps in the case of
small, closely-held businesses. Shareholders of a large land development
company or a multinational agribusiness, for example, are unlikely to be
aware of or care about the impacts of regulation on their autonomy so much
as its impact on their ability to acquire wealth through the activities of the
company. 177 Indeed, some shareholders support regulation notwithstanding
175. The claim of property rights is asserted confidently as though claims to property rights always
serve a consistent and well-defined set of values. The assertion of the right is most directly countered by
a denial of the existence of a right, thus deflecting debate from the question of the underlying values at
stake.
176. Other corporate forms, such as limited liability companies and various forms of partnerships,
have slightly different structures, but the basic premise remains true. The entity is designed to protect the
financial interests of the investors-either through direct management or through management by fiduci-
aries accountable to the investors.
177. Mark Sagoff's related distinction between the role of a person as consumer and as citizen high-
lights the way in which people may hold different values when they act in different realms. MARK
SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988). Here I am
emphasizing the role of the person as investor, which is closer to that of a consumer (of financial prod-
ucts). The prevalence of mutual funds and of institutional investors as shareholders further weakens the
idea that individual shareholders' interest in autonomy is at issue.
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its costs to them. In general, it seems fair to say that investing with the goal
of acquiring wealth is more often a means by which investors seek to ad-
vance their well-being, not a means they pursue to exercise their freedom to
dredge or fill wetlands. 78 Regulation reduces the profitability of economic
activity in wetlands; thus, it most often affects those linked values of well-
being and economic wealth-not the more often identified value of auton-
omy.
A third value, beyond autonomy and economic well-being that may
stand in tension with the values embodied in functioning wetlands, is fair-
ness or distributive justice. Fairness always lurks at the margins of the de-
bate on wetlands, but it is generally addressed obliquely. 79 Those who as-
sert values in opposition to regulation emphasize that most wetlands are
privately owned. The entire public derives benefits from the services and
values that privately-owned wetlands provide, but the owners of wetlands
alone bear a special attendant burden. They have title to the land but cannot
develop it without obtaining a permit. The owner of wetlands can thus claim
unfairness stemming from the expectation in purchasing the land that it
could be developed like all other land.
These claims regarding fairness tread into difficult territory, premised as
they are on facts about landowner expectations and knowledge, which facts
are not uniform to all landowners and are difficult to discern. Thus, there is
a competing set of factual assumptions that challenges the claim that regula-
tion is unfair. This view casts the facts related to landowner expectations
and knowledge differently. It emphasizes the history of wetlands regulation
and the long tradition of treating wetlands as a common resource subject to
the public trust. 80 For thirty years, landowners in the United States have
been subject to highly visible restrictions if they purchase and seek to
dredge or fill wetlands. Seen from this perspective, a landowner's rights are
not unfairly changed by a permit denial or condition imposed today; no new
burden has been suddenly imposed. The landowner is not disproportionately
or unfairly burdened because in acquiring wetlands, she had reason to know
that she was acquiring highly-regulated lands. The factual premise here is
that it is reasonable to expect a landowner to be mindful of the limited rights
associated with wetlands when purchasing them. The debate about values
depends on the facts, including when the land was purchased, knowledge
about the land and familiarity with the law, and judgments regarding what
expectations are reasonable.
178. The legislative proposals from those who oppose wetlands regulation tend to confirm this identi-
fication of pursuit of economic wealth as the primary value at stake. Most of the proposed legislation in
the 1990s focused on requiring governmental payments to landowners who were not permitted to de-
velop wetlands rather than on removing the restrictions on their autonomy. See, e.g., Private Property
Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (Ist Sess. 1995).
179. Houck, Open Letter to Reilly, supra note 72.
180. Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law, 15 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 247 (1996); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471,457-78 (1970).
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Thus, in debates about wetlands regulation, those claiming that regula-
tion is unfair generally present the picture of an individual landowner who
was reasonably unaware of having bought wetlands. Those emphasizing the
fairness of regulation point to cases of large professional development com-
panies that have recently and knowingly purchased wetlands, well aware of
the regulatory implications. Resolving the underlying policy questions is not
easy, but open discussion of the factual assumptions relevant to fairness is a
first step.
One foundation for policy would be to try to discern the expectations
and knowledge of each owner of wetlands on a case-by-case basis, an ap-
proach that seems excessively costly were it even possible. An alternative
would be to make assumptions or generalizations about the level of knowl-
edge and expectations of landowners based on the best summary informa-
tion we can reasonably obtain. 181 Of course, no set of assumptions will be
accurate in every case. However, if we face the facts honestly and accept
them, we may be able to discern categories that reflect significant differ-
ences among landowner situations. It is possible that we could identify a
class of cases where fairness is most likely to be implicated and develop a
policy that treated different landowners differently where fairness concerns
are present. 82 By sometimes failing to embrace the relevance of economic
well-being and fairness, conservationists invite those who oppose regulation
to claim these values and control the debate about them. The result is a pol-
icy debated dominated by anecdotes and counter-anecdotes that never fairly
engage or resolve the issue.
Beyond these rational values of human well-being, autonomy, and fair-
ness, the incessant pressure to convert wetlands may also reflect a deeper,
less rational impulse to resolve the uncomfortable ambiguity wetlands rep-
resent, to order a complex and seemingly chaotic landscape, to control it
and render it more hospitable to direct human occupation. Beyond the prac-
tical constraints that wetlands impose on human domination, even their po-
etic functions are limited.183 They lack a connection to a positive mythol-
ogy. Wetlands may still generate a visceral sense of alienation. Even in cre-
ating value for humans, they remain apart: much of the value they create is
through the indirect services they perform without human intervention or
181. For example, surveys to determine the level of public awareness of wetlands regulation, the
frequency with which owners purchase wetlands without knowing of their existence, and other relevant
facts could provide a useful base of information from which to derive reasonable assumptions.
182. The test under the Fifth Amendment that separates compensable from non-compensable gov-
ernmental incursions has long been analyzed as drawing a line based on factual distinctions, in part to
reflect fairness concerns. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). It is possible that aspects of
the current program, such as the general permit covering residential, commercial, and institutional de-
velopment that cause no greater than one-half acre loss of non-tidal waters, already address fairness
concerns. This and other general permits cover many of the activities small non-corporate landowners
most often engage in.
183. For example, wetlands often fail to evoke the qualities that underlie the poetic significance of
water, such as a mirror-like quality, clarity, and purity. See, e.g., GASTON BACHELARD, WATER AND
DREAMS: AN ESSAY ON THE IMAGINATION OF MATTER 14, 20-22,133-35 (Edith R. Farrell trans., 1983).
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participation, rather than as a result of human occupation. The tremendous
public education and shift in attitudes since the 1970s has done much to
overcome the historic attitudes that cast wetlands as sites of disease and
danger. But recognizing that some ambivalence remains may help to guide
future efforts to develop a coherent policy. If reluctance to embrace the
value of wetlands plays a role in the public policy debate, it operates as a
hidden counterweight against wetlands conservation. Perhaps the balance to
this force lies in the facts about wetland loss. If ambivalence limits our em-
brace of the values of wetlands, knowledge of the ongoing loss and threat of
loss may provide the needed motivation to shake any remaining cloud of
irrational ambivalence.
C. The Ongoing Loss of Wetlands and the Role of Regulation
The central facts about loss of wetlands are well known and easily
grasped: we have destroyed vast amounts of wetlands and continue to pre-
side over their destruction. A series of government reports issued in the
1980s and 1990s provided the first comprehensive evaluation of the historic
and ongoing loss of wetlands in the United States. 184 These studies paint a
picture of dramatic wetland loss. Fifty percent of the wetlands in the forty-
eight coterminous states disappeared between the 1780s and 1983, repre-
senting an average annual loss of roughly 550,000 acres per year that con-
tinued throughout this two-hundred-year period. 85 Policies that encouraged
wetlands conversion and the persistent pressures of agriculture, urban de-
velopment, transportation, and water control and supply projects contributed
to drainage and filling of wetlands throughout this period. 18
6
184. THOMAS. E. DAHL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE
CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES, 1986 TO 1997 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 STATUS AND TRENDS];
THOMAS E. DAHL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, WETLANDS LOSSES IN THE UNITED STATES 1780s TO
1980s (1999) [hereinafter WETLANDS LOSSES]; THOMAS E. DAHL & GREGORY J. ALLORD, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF WETLANDS: HISTORY OF WETLANDS IN THE
CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES (1990), available at
http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/history.html [hereinafter TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF WETLANDS];
THOMAS E. DAHL & CRAIG E. JOHNSON, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, STATUS AND TRENDS OF
WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES, MID- 1970S TO MID- 1980S (1991) [hereinafter 1991
STATUS AND TRENDS]; RALPH W. TINER, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, WETLANDS OF THE UNITED
STATES: CURRENT STATUS AND RECENT TRENDS (1984) [hereinafter 1984 STATUS AND TRENDS]; U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND REGULATION (1984) [hereinaf-
ter WETLANDS USE AND REGULATION].
185. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that Alaska had 170 million acres of wetlands in
the 1780s and the coterminous forty-eight states had 221 million acres. See WETLANDS LOSSES, supra
note 184, at 1. By 1983, only 103.3 million acres of wetlands remained in the lower forty-eight states,
less than half of the wetlands present in the 1780s. See 1991 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 184, at 1.
An estimated 97.8 million acres of freshwater wetlands and 5.5 million acres of estuarine (coastal)
wetlands remained as of 1983. Id.
186. See TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF WETLANDS, supra note 184, at 2-9. The federal government pro-
moted wetland destruction and land drainage through a variety of legislative and policy instruments,
including the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, several programs administered by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Agriculture Conservation Program (whose policies caused
wetland losses averaging 550,000 acres each year from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s). Id. Agriculture
alone was responsible for more than 80% of wetlands loss. Id.
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The 1960s marked the beginning of a sea change in attitudes towards
wetlands, but economic pressure to drain and fill wetlands continued. 87 The
enactment of section 404 in 1972 began a shift in policies away from pro-
moting wetlands destruction and towards wetlands conservation. Since the
1970s, the rate of wetlands loss has slowed significantly. 88 Our techniques
for calculating even ongoing gross acreage losses are crude and imperfect,
but the pace of net wetlands loss seems to have slowed from 550,000 acres
per year to somewhere between 58,000 and 90,000 acres per year.' 89 When
one considers the figures on wetlands loss over time, the trend is encourag-
ing. There is steady progress that some believe will culminate in no net loss
and others claim has already produced no net loss. 190
Beyond the total acreage lost, government reports detail the complex
dance as some wetlands are filled to become uplands or dredged to become
deepwater. 191 Others are converted by humans from forested wetlands like
swamps into emergent and shrub wetlands including marshes. 92 At the
same time, uplands are scraped down to increase the total stock of wetlands,
largely ponds.' 93 We are moving the matrix of wetlands around, reconfigur-
ing the landscape at the same time that we diminish the total acreage that
constitutes wetlands.
This picture of slowed loss of wetlands is encouraging, but to evaluate
the role of section 404 in protecting wetlands demands that we also look
behind these numbers at the rate of loss attributable to different activities
and the impact of section 404 on these various activities. We can refine our
understanding further by considering the distinct causes of loss and patterns
of loss for freshwater and coastal wetlands 194 and the regional patterns of
187. 2000 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 184, at 30-32.
188. Id. at 34.
189. Dahl calculates the average rate of loss over the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s at
458,000 acres per year. See id. Between 1970 and 1980, the average annual net wetland loss for the
conterminous United States was 290,000 acres of wetlands each year. Id. Between 1986 and 1997, the
net loss of wetlands in the conterminous United States appeared to slow dramatically. The total wetland
loss for the decade amounted to only 644,000 acres, or an average of 58,500 acres of wetlands per year.
Id. at 9, 34. A contrasting assessment by the Natural Resource Conservation Service for the overlapping
period of 1982 through 1992 suggests a rate of loss of 70,000 to 90,000 acres a year on non-federal
lands. Ralph Heimlich & Jeanne Melanson, Wetlands Lost, Wetlands Gained, 17 NAT'L WETLANDS
NEWSL. I (May-June 1995).
190. See WETLANDS AND AGRICULTURE, supra note 24, at 53 (noting progress towards no net loss
and assessing role of current programs in continuing and sustaining gains); see also Jonathan Tolman,
Achieving No Net Loss, 17 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 5 (May-June 1995) (claiming that acreage of
wetlands restored under the Partners for Wildlife Program, North American Waterfowl Management
Plan, Wetlands Reserve Program, and mitigation under section 404 exceeded acreage lost in 1994).
These latter claims are hard to verify and reflect a focus on acreage without any assessment of functions
and values.
191. 1991 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 184, at 10-13.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. From the 1950s to the 1970s, close to 90% of conversions from wetland to non-wetland areas
occurred in inland freshwater areas. WETLANDS USE AND REGULATION, supra note 184, at 87. Ap-
proximately 80% of actual losses in these freshwater areas involved the draining and clearing of inland
wetlands for agricultural purposes; 8% resulted from the construction of impoundments and large reser-
voirs; 6% from urbanization; and 6% from other causes, including mining, forestry, and road construc-
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loss. 195 Destruction of wetlands for agriculture has been the leading cause of
wetlands loss historically and continues to be a major factor. 96 However,
the contribution from agriculture to total losses has fallen dramatically in
recent years. 197 Programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program, Part-
ners in Wildlife, and the North American Waterfowl Conservation Plan,
coupled with the disincentives of Swampbuster, have played a leading role
both in discouraging conversion and achieving conservation and restoration.
It is also important to consider the quality and function of the remaining
acreage of wetlands. The impact of human activities on the overall quality
of the remaining wetlands in terms of the functions and values they embody
is uncertain.198 What we know suggests that the loss figures would be con-
siderably higher if we were able to assess and quantify the reduced or lost
functions and values of those wetlands we count as preserved. 199 The na-
tional studies of wetland acreage explicitly disclaim any assessment of qual-
ity.2°° And where gains in wetlands are reported, the types of wetlands cre-
ated or restored may not replace lost functions.20 1 By these measures, the
steady loss continues.
tion. Id. Of the losses of coastal wetlands, approximately 56% resulted from dredging for marinas, ca-
nals, and port development, and to a lesser extent from shoreline erosion; 22% from urbanization; 14%
from disposing of dredged material or the creation of beaches; 6% from natural or man-induced transi-
tion of saltwater wetlands to freshwater wetlands; and 2% from agriculture. Id.
195. See Babcock, supra note 11, at 313-17. Various reports from the Department of the Interior
based on the National Wetlands Inventory have provided some insight into relative losses in different
regions of the United States. See 2000 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 184, at 54-55; A REPORT TO
CONGRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS ON WETLANDS
(1988); RALPH W. TINER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOGRAPHICALLY ISOLATED
WETLANDS: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND STATUS IN SELECTED
AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES (June 2002), available at
http://www.wetlands.fws.gov/Pubs Reports/isolated/report.htm.
196. Estimates for the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s show 80% of freshwater wetland
loss for agricultural purposes. WETLANDS USE AND REGULATION, supra note 184, at 87. Conversions to
agricultural land uses accounted for 54% of the losses of wetlands between 1970 and 1980, while con-
versions to other uses accounted for 41% of the wetlands losses. 1991 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note
184, at 15. Between 1986 and 1997, the losses attributed to agriculture dropped 26% of the total. Id. at
29, 45. However, this number very likely over-reports the conversion to non-agricultural uses because a
substantial part of this acreage had been cleared and drained but not yet put to an identifiable use-
agricultural or not. 1991 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 184, at 2. Thus, it seems likely that some
proportion of these acres were converted for future agricultural purposes.
197. 2000 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 184, at 45.
198. See 1991 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 184, at 4.
199. This would include wetlands that lose some of their values and functions when they are sur-
rounded by development, as well as created wetlands that may appear as wetlands but have a low long-
term success rate. See 2000 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 184, at 45 (noting that 40% of sampled
freshwater wetlands were adjacent to or on agricultural lands and potentially adversely affected); Alyson
C. Flournoy, Preserving Dynamic Systems: Wetlands, Ecology, and Law, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
105, 120-22 (1996) [hereinafter Flournoy, Preserving Dynamic Systems]; Ann M. Redmond, Florida
Moves to Mitigation Banking, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 14 (Nov.-Dec. 1995).
200. See, e.g., 1991 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 184, at 4.
201. For example, a dramatic gain of 2.6 million acres in open ponds since the mid-1950s likely
reflects stormwater retention pond creation. From 1985 to 1995, this category of wetland increased 14%
to reach 5.2 million acres, while freshwater (palustrine) wetlands lost 870,000 acres. See Teresa Opheim,
Wetland Losses Continue but have Slowed, 20 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 7 (Nov.-Dec. 1997).
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Unless there is an effective method under the section 404 program for
the Corps to identify thresholds below which certain values and functions
are irretrievably lost, and to stop that loss, section 404's main long-term
legacy will have been to slow the rate of loss of wetlands and the values
they provide. This is a value, but a very compromised one. It has value in
that it buys time for programs that restore wetlands and acquire them for
conservation.2 °2 Given the diversity of values that the Corps public interest
review considers, the lack of any absolute limit on Corps discretion to grant
permits, and the lack of adequate information about cumulative loss of val-
ues and functions, the most likely prospect is a continued steady loss of
wetland functions and values.
An important question to ask is what role 404 has played. To the extent
the rate of loss has slowed, it seems unlikely that section 404 is entirely
responsible for the decline in the rate of wetlands loss, 20 3 although section
404 has undoubtedly played some role. It is interesting to inquire as to how
section 404 has effectively slowed development. One impulse is to assume
that section 404 stops development by denying permits to applicants who
would otherwise have filled wetlands.204 But the available figures tell a dif-
ferent story. Applicants who pursue the process to the end more often than
not receive a permit-in some districts, overwhelmingly so.20 5 During fiscal
years 1996 to 1999, only 0.3% of individual permit applications were de-
nied.20 6 A journalist's study of permitting in Florida revealed that the Corps
approved 8300 permits and denied one between 1998 and 2002.207 Between
1992 and June 2001, the same study showed that 25,767 permits were
granted and thirty-four were denied.20 8 Meanwhile, the vast majority of ac-
tivities authorized nationwide, though not the majority of the acreage af-
fected, occur without review under general permits. 209
202. See Houck, War, supra note 11, at 365.
203. Various factors appear to have contributed to the slower pace of wetlands loss. The slowed rate
of conversion to farmland in particular seems to reflect the suite of agricultural programs that encourage
wetland conservation and discourage wetlands destruction. These include the Swampbuster Program, the
Wetlands Reserve Programs, the Water Bank Program for Wetlands Preservation, as well as programs
under the North American Waterfowl Management Plan and Partners for Wildlife. See infra note 214.
Analysts also point to shifts in agricultural commodity markets that reduced incentives to convert wet-
lands and to widespread public awareness and changed attitudes towards wetlands, Heimlich & Melan-
son, supra note 189, at I, 23-25. Nonetheless, a 1988 report by the Department of the Interior listed
among the reasons why farmers sometimes converted wetlands in the Prairie Pothole region notwith-
standing the lack of economic benefit that "[s]ome operators seem to enjoy engaging in drainage in their
spare time." A REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 195, at 88.
204. Searchinger, supra note 163, at 24.
205. See id.; Ted Brown, Clariffing Classification, 15 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 9 (Jan.-Feb. 1993)
(reporting on Arvida's success in obtaining permits).
206. Jeffrey A. Zinn & Claudia Copeland, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress:
Wetlands Issues, at CRS-5 (updated Oct. 9, 2002).
207. Derek Catron, Wetlands Under Siege, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-J., Jan. 27, 2002, at IA.
208. Id.
209. General permits accounted for 84% of all permit requests between 1996 and 1999. Zinn &
Copeland, supra note 206, at CRS-5. According to the National Research Council, general permits
generate approximately 12,000 acres of wetland loss per year. COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES,
supra note 9, at 3, 17.
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So any success in slowing wetlands loss seems to come largely from
something other than the denial of permits. As the Corps has frequently
pointed out in defending its record, many projects are dropped or modified
to satisfy Corps concerns, reducing the wetland acreage affected. 2 0 Thus,
even an approval may represent a victory for protection of wetlands values
where the project has been modified to preserve relevant wetland values.
Unfortunately, the Corps has not maintained a record of the acreage thus
preserved.2
Economic interests who wish to alter wetlands describe the high cost in
time and dollars of obtaining a section 404 permit. 212 It seems likely, as
others have claimed, that the delay and cost of obtaining a section 404 per-
mit have played some role in deterring the destruction of wetlands.213
Though reliance on such a crudely-shaped tool as regulatory delay and costs
associated with the permit process might horrify economists, the regulatory
cost of permitting under section 404 may be forcing landowners to internal-
ize some or all of the costs imposed on society by wetlands development.
Without regulation, there are clearly social costs associated with the indi-
vidual and cumulative loss of wetlands, and these costs are not borne exclu-
sively by those who develop wetlands. Those downstream and those who
value the wildlife associated with the wetlands or other wetlands in the
same basin also bear the cost of the loss of the functions and values that we
214know wetlands protect.
So if we look at wetlands development as an activity that imposes ex-
ternal costs on society, perhaps the costs associated with obtaining a permit,
while not designed as nor constituting an accurate measure of these external
costs, serve as surrogates. Economics has not yet developed the capacity to
produce a consensus methodology for valuing wetlands in dollars, and given
the complexity of this task, we are unlikely to achieve such advances any-
time soon.215 In the meantime, however imperfect, perhaps the regulatory
210. GAO, CORPS ADMIN., supra note 9, at 22. Withdrawals accounted for 8.7% of all applications
in fiscal year 1994, but over half of these withdrawals were because of errors in recordkeeping or be-
cause no permit or only a general permit was required. Teresa Opheim, Section 404's Efficiency: A Spin
at the Numbers, 18 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 2, 3 (Mar.-Apr. 1996). Even where permits are granted,
mitigation required under section 404 has offset losses, particularly through restoration. For a discussion
on the qualified nature of mitigation's success, see Houck, More Net Loss of Wetlands, supra note 53.
211. In its response to the 1988 GAO study, the Corps pointed to both the limited value of such
statistics and the high cost of assembling them. See GAO, CORPS ADMIN., supra note 9, at 95 (Depart-
ment of Defense comments).
212. See Michael L. Davis, A More Effective and Flexible Section 404, 17 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL.
7 (July-Aug. 1995); Deely & Latham, supra note 46, at 968 (describing delays and uncertainty involved
in jurisdictional determinations).
213. See Ralph Heimlich et al., Sustaining Our Wetland Gains, 19 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 5, 8-9
(July-Aug. 1997); Letter to the Editor from Ralph Heimlich, 18 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 3 (July-
Aug. 1996); Catron, supra note 207 (noting comments of former Corps attorney Royal Gardner on how
cost and delay discourage many potential applicants); Department of Defense Comments, reprinted in
GAO, CORPS ADMIN., supra note 9, at 95.
214. See PAUL F. SCODARI, MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL WETLANDS PROGRAMS 13-14
(1997); Davis, supra note 212, at 7.
215. SCODARI, supra note 214, at 3-4, 64-69, 75-76.
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costs imposed by section 404 are a significant and valid part of section
404's success: by creating an effective set of economic disincentives for
wetlands regulation, Congress has slowed the pace of development.
We have no way of measuring whether the owners of the most valuable
wetlands are those who are deterred. But combined with the reduced im-
pacts that result from permit denials and modifications, deterrence may in-
deed be contributing to section 404's impact. One can argue whether the
costs imposed are too high or too low, but certainly a regime with no costs
undervalues wetlands. And given the pace at which wetland loss continues,
it seems that if we want to preserve wetlands values, not merely slow their
loss, then current constraints undervalue wetlands.
Information on the Corps' regulatory program suggests that funding of
section 404 implementation fails to enable the program to meet its potential.
The move to general permits and the breadth of the general permit program
reflect, in part, the lack of agency resources relative to the volume of permit
applications. The pressures on the Corps to speed permit processing in re-
cent years have been substantial.2t 6 The Corps has tried to respond to criti-
cism of the delay in permitting by the regulated community, but without
additional resources, the only available avenue is to reduce the time spent
on each. Nor have significant new resources been added following reports
that criticized the inadequate review, monitoring, and enforcement prac-
tices. 17 Site visits are a rarity except on large projects.1 8 And monitoring of
mitigation is very limited.1 9
Given the limitations of our understanding, rules and practices that al-
low ongoing loss of wetlands without any meaningful goal or policy place
what we value about wetlands at risk. The story of the farmer and the pig
with the wooden leg captures best the path we are on.220 We are consuming
wetlands and simultaneously extolling their virtues as functioning ecosys-
tems. An analogy would be to permit private actors to dismantle the electri-
cal grid piece-by-piece, with no clear stopping point determined, believing
that the grid will continue to function simply because we are minimizing the
pieces we remove from it. Our policies with respect to the complex interre-
lated matrix of wetlands are the equivalent of such a policy. But if we face
the facts, we know that systems will fail. Services are lost, at some point
irretrievably. Moreover, because wetlands operate in a scattered matrix
216. See Catron, supra note 207 (citing comments by former Corps employees on the pressure to
grant permits and to act quickly as part of job performance).
217. See, e.g., COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES, supra note 9, at 101-02 (citing inadequacy of
enforcement and monitoring and inadequate resources to review permit applications). Funding for spe-
cific new initiatives, such as $5 million appropriated in fiscal year 2000 to establish administrative
appeals of jurisdictional determinations, may speed permit review and ensure that determinations are not
overly broad but will not enhance consideration of environmental values. Id.
218. Catron, supra note 207 (quoting a Corps project manager in Florida).
219. COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES, supra note 9, at 101.
220. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Restoration Rx: An Evaluation and Prescription, 42 ARIz. L. REV. 187
(2000). This is based on a story appearing in DAVID R. COLBURN & LANCE DEHAVEN-SMITH,
GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE STATE: FLORIDA SINCE STATEHOOD 118 (1999).
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across the landscape, they are lost irretrievably at each point in the land-
scape where they are removed.221 No one can calculate the long-term impact
of these changes. Nor can we anticipate the costs that we will face when we
confront the results of present policies in an uncertain future environment
where the unknowable impacts of global warming become an irreversible
reality.
VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY ON WETLANDS
This view of the first thirty years under section 404 suggests a need to
step back and engage the broader question of our national policy on wet-
lands. Essential to any debate on objectives and goals is straightforward
discussion of the relevant values at stake, grounded in reality rather than
myth. Resolving the issues raised by such a discussion may ultimately de-
mand new information beyond what is currently available. Greater clarity
about our values will help in the decision about whether to commit further
resources to advance our knowledge base.
As we consider the tools available to accomplish our goals, we need to
consider all available policy tools and the costs associated with pursuing
various objectives under different strategies. Both the structural impedi-
ments inherent in section 404 and the important role in wetlands conserva-
tion played by programs other than section 404 counsel that the focus of
debate be broader than section 404.222 We need a national policy dialogue
that is broad enough to encompass regulatory and non-regulatory initiatives,
to address the threats from both urban and agricultural conversion, and to
consider the costs and benefits of wetland protection under a range of
223
strategies.
Beyond the reaches of section 404, complementary wetlands conserva-
tion initiatives under the auspices of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of the Interior have helped to compensate for the shortcomings
of section 404. Beginning with the highly successful Swampbuster program
in 1985, and including the Wetlands Reserve Program and the North
American Waterfowl Management Plan, Congress has enacted and funded
programs that have both discouraged wetlands conversion and subsidized
wetland conservation and restoration. 224 This resort to non-regulatory
221. Successful mitigation or restoration may minimize the loss, but see Floumoy, Preserving Dy-
namic Systems, supra note 199, at 126-31, for a brief summary of the limitations of mitigation.
222. The work of several scholars and the conclusions of government reports have documented the
inadequacy of section 404 standing alone as a means to protect wetlands. See GAO, CORPS ADMIN.,
supra note 9, at 2-4; Babcock, supra note 11, at 318-28; Houck, Alternatives, supra note 11, at 773;
Houck, War, supra note I1, at 361-74.
223. Coordination of federal programs with state and local government conservation programs will
also be an important dimension of any policy development process.
224. An analysis of Swampbuster by the Department of Agriculture predicted that without this pro-
gram an additional 5.8 to 13.2 million acres of wetlands would be converted. WETLANDS AND
AGRICULTURE, supra note 24, at 21, 35. The Wetlands Reserve Program and Emergency Wetlands
Reserve Program protected some 533,026 acres between 1992 and 1997. Id. at 45.
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strategies has been widely praised and is now viewed by most as an essen-
tial component of any comprehensive effort at wetlands conservation.225
The annual challenge to secure funding to continue these programs and the
shift in agriculture subsidy policies may necessitate some rethinking of
these programs. Moreover, their relationship to section 404 needs to be bet-
ter considered and funding strategies and goals integrated. For example,
determining the appropriate level of funding for the Wetlands Reserve Pro-
gram should not happen solely as part of the debate on the annual farm bill
completely independent from consideration of the funding needs for effec-
tive monitoring and enforcement of section 404 and the likely gains in wet-
land conservation through each investment.
It is true that the risks associated with opening political debate are sub-
stantial for anyone who cares about wetland conservation. Conservationists
may fear the fact that neither the current Administration nor the present
Congress seems likely to endorse a strong wetland policy. At the same time,
the lessons learned from the failed environmental initiatives in the Contract
with America impel caution about opening debate among those who favor
less regulation as well. But at some point, the risks of not opening the de-
bate are higher than the risks of doing so. This Article suggests what we can
learn from the first thirty years under section 404 that could productively
inform such a debate, should an opportune moment arise.
The Forum convened by the Conservation Foundation in 1987 promised
to initiate just such a dialogue on wetlands conservation. Unfortunately, its
bottom line-no net loss-proved too easily claimed as a political slogan.
No net loss has served to stifle meaningful policy debate, falsely employed
to assure the public that there is nothing at risk from current practices and
policies. But the report of the Forum, as well as the work of scholars, non-
governmental organizations, and agencies, has generated a wealth of inter-
esting policy proposals over the last twenty years that warrants full review
and consideration as we move forward. The key to success will be a broad
focus and a grounding in good information.
Without an honest policy debate that openly addresses the questions of
what we value and why, and the effect of current practices on that which we
value, we will never develop policies that can be enforced, that can mature,
and that have long-term effect. Without such policies, those constrained by
section 404 will pursue a strategy of endless technical attacks on the scope
of section 404. And those who wish to strengthen it will continue to offer
the same rationales for enhancing or maintaining its protection, without
meaningful engagement on the issue of the best means and the cost. Our
national "policy" on wetlands will meander, blown back and forth by politi-
cal winds, never maturing. And we will continue to suffer a slow, steady
225. Broader acquisition and restoration strategies and potential funding sources are discussed in
Houck, War, supra note 11, at 367-69.
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bleed from our stock of wetlands while sustaining the myth that they are
protected.
There is no formula that will successfully transform the debate on wet-
lands. Indeed, as with much environmental policy and law, change may
depend on a chance occurrence that galvanizes public interest and atten-
tion-new data on wetlands status and trends, television coverage of a dra-
matic event like flooding exacerbated by the collapse of wetland functions,
or concern about the impacts of global warming on coastal wetlands. The
EPA's recent repudiation of its efforts to narrow section 404 jurisdiction in
the wake of the SWANCC decision suggests that public concern about wet-
lands remains a political force. Even should an occasion arise to refocus
public attention on wetland protection, initiating a national policy dialogue
that is not merely reactive will demand leadership, courage, and skill. With-
out these, section 404 promises to continue its contribution to slowing wet-
lands loss, or destroying wetlands slowly, as you choose. Notwithstanding
its flaws, it deserves a better goal and fate.

